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ABSTRACT—Recent scientific evidence is proving that toxic releases have
long-term, unintended, and harmful consequences for the marine
environment. Though a new paradigm is emerging in the scientific
literature—one demonstrating that long-term impacts from oil spills are
more significant than previously thought—legal scholars, regulators, and
courts have yet to consider the law’s ability to remedy long-term ecological
harms. While scholars have exhaustively debated causation questions
related to latent injuries for toxic torts, they have overlooked the equally
important and conceptually similar causation problems of long-term
damages in the natural resource context. Likewise, only a few courts have
considered the standards of proving causation for natural resource
damages. They have not considered long-term injuries.
This Article provides a foundation for developing causation
frameworks that respect the complexities of long-term ecological harms.
Specifically, this Article uses scientific research to illustrate the causal
difficulty of proving long-term ecological injuries. In doing so, it
establishes the foreseeability of long-term injuries and the inadequacy of
applying a traditional torts paradigm. Ultimately, this Article looks to toxic
tort law and risk-of-injury cases for possible approaches to the causation
challenges raised by long-term ecological injuries—these are challenges
that, like latent toxic tort injuries, raise issues of time delay, aggregate
exposure, synergistic effects, and multiple possible sources of harm.
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School
of Law. Thank you to Professors Bob Anderson, Robin Craig, Holly
Doremus, Eric Freyfogle, Dave Owen, Bill Rodgers, and other participants
in the 2012 UW Law Young Environmental Scholars Workshop, all of
whom commented on an early draft of this work. A special thank you to
Robin Craig for providing detailed comments on subsequent drafts, Judge
Guido Calabresi for offering insightful feedback during the Yale/
Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum, and my research assistants Devra
Cohen and Oliver Stiefel for their hard work.

475

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 476
I.

II.

THE NEED FOR A NEW CAUSAL PARADIGM............................................................ 482
A.

The Foreseeability and Significance of Long-Term Injuries ....................... 484

B.

The Complicated Task of Proving Long-Term Injury ................................. 490

C.

Ruling Out a Traditional “But-For” Approach to Causation..................... 496

ASSESSING THE SPACE FOR A NEW CAUSAL PARADIGM ......................................... 499
A.

Room Within Tort Law................................................................................ 500

B.

Room Within the Statutory Framework....................................................... 502

C.

Room Within the Existing Jurisprudence .................................................... 506

D.

Room Within Broader Tort Goals of Corrective Justice and Deterrence ... 510

III. IDENTIFYING THE CORE CAUSAL CHALLENGES ..................................................... 515
IV. IN SEARCH OF CLARITY AND A NEW CAUSAL PARADIGM ...................................... 522
A.

Assessing the Contributing Factor Test ...................................................... 522

B.

Borrowing from Toxic Torts ....................................................................... 530

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 540

INTRODUCTION
With news cameras watching and oil still visible, it is easy to see the
direct and devastating impacts of a spill in the days, weeks, and months
following an oil spill disaster. In Prince William Sound—in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill of 1989—the bird carcasses lined up on oily
beaches bore a striking resemblance to bodies on a battlefield.1 In San
Francisco Bay—in the wake of the Cosco Busan Spill of 2007—tides
carried a plume of heavy fuel beneath the Golden Gate Bridge as wildlife
rescue workers combed beaches to save birds, fish, invertebrates, and
marine mammals.2 In the Gulf of Mexico—in the wake of the BP Gulf Oil
1

Body counts were high in the wake of the Exxon spill. Searchers found carcasses of 1016 sea
otters, 36,309 seabirds, and 144 eagles. JOE HUNT, MISSION WITHOUT A MAP: THE POLITICS AND
POLICIES OF RESTORATION FOLLOWING THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 5 (2009), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ocs/mafac/meetings/2010_06/docs/mission_without_map_evos.pdf
(providing a documented history, derived mostly from the public record and personal interviews, of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, a group of federal and state government trustees responsible
for assessing and restoring natural resource injuries). These estimates represented only a fraction of the
true death toll given that most carcasses sink. J.A. Wiens, Recovery of Seabirds Following the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, in EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: FATE AND EFFECTS IN ALASKAN WATERS 854, 870
(Peter G. Wells, James N. Butler & Jane S. Hughes eds., 1995) [hereinafter FATE AND EFFECTS].
2
See Bryan Walsh, Oily: How a San Francisco Oil Spill Took Its Toll on Fish, TIME SCI. & SPACE
(Dec. 28, 2011), http://science.time.com/2011/12/28/oily-how-a-san-francisco-oil-spill-took-its-toll-onfish/; see also Terence Chea, San Francisco Oil Spill Threatens Wildlife, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS
(Nov. 9, 2007), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/11/071109-AP-bay-spill.html. The
Cosco Busan spill released “about 53,000 gallons of fuel oil into the San Francisco Bay” when the ship
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Spill of 2010—oil-stained pelicans, dead and dying deep sea corals, and
green sea turtle necropsies3 gave glimpses of the ecological suffering that
lurked in the shadows of burning oil fires.4
When the world’s media outlets are flooded with graphic imagery of
dead birds, oil-covered otters, and stranded whales, calls for greater
vigilance in the form of tighter regulations are soon to follow.5 Public
outcry and political motivation similarly press government trustees to
assess damages and hold responsible parties liable through civil and
criminal settlements.
As striking as the images of oil and death are in the immediate wake of
oil spills, the highly visible physical impacts of the spills fade relatively
quickly. A more sinister set of concerns about long-term harms soon begins
collided with the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge in November 2007. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD.,
MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: ALLISION OF HONG KONG-REGISTERED CONTAINERSHIP M/V COSCO
BUSAN WITH THE DELTA TOWER OF THE SAN FRANCISCO–OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE, SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 7, 2007 xi (2009).
No injuries or fatalities resulted from the accident, but the fuel spill contaminated about 26 miles
of shoreline, killed more than 2,500 birds of about 50 species, temporarily closed a fishery on the
bay, and delayed the start of the crab-fishing season. Total monetary damages were estimated to
be $2.1 million for the ship, $1.5 million for the bridge, and more than $70 million for
environmental cleanup.
Id. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the pilot’s use of “impairing prescription
medications” was the most likely cause of the collision. Id.
3
A necropsy is “an autopsy performed on an animal.” Necropsy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/necropsy (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
4
The BP Gulf Oil Spill occurred on April 20, 2010, when the two-and-a-half-mile deep Macondo
well exploded, leading to the sinking of BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, the death of eleven crew
members, and “the largest oil spill in U.S. history.” NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON
OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT vi–vii (2011) [hereinafter DEEP WATER COMMISSION
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OIL
COMMISSION.pdf. The spill released more than 170 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.
Press Release, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Oil Spill
Commission Landmark Report on Gulf Disaster Proposes Urgent Reform of Industry and Government
Practices to Overhaul U.S. Offshore Drilling Safety 8 (Jan. 11, 2011) (on file with the Northwestern
University Law Review). In the words of Commission Co-Chair William K. Reilly, the oil that spilled
from the Macondo well “will harm the natural ecology of the Gulf in ways that will take decades to
understand.” Id. For an example of striking photographs in the wake of the BP Gulf Oil Spill, see Gulf
Oil Spill, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/10/gulf-oil-spill/gulf-spillphotography (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). See also Louisiana Oil Spill 2010 Photos: Gulf of Mexico
Disaster Unfolds, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/30/louisiana-oil-spill2010_n_558287.html#s159581 (last updated May 25, 2011).
5
Though to many a distant memory, some consider the disturbing and dramatic images of the
Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969 a significant catalyst in the birth of the modern-day environmental
movement. See Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 113, 138–39 (2010). Similarly, it is well accepted that outrage over the devastation in Prince
William Sound, Alaska, directly spurred Congress to enact the Oil Spill Act of 1990 in an effort to
shore up oil prevention and response regulations. See, e.g., Janet E. Milne, Earmarking for
Environmental Damage: From Oil Spills to Climate Change, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10,334, 10,335 (2011).
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to set in. What are the long-term impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on
the Prince William Sound ecosystem? Why have the Pacific herring all but
disappeared from Prince William Sound when the fishery was reporting
record numbers just before the spill?6 Is lingering oil still toxic to the
harlequin ducks and sea otters that feed in intertidal areas?7 Why are pink
salmon eggs dying in streams exposed to weathered oil?8 Does the decline
of sea lions relate to the disappearance of herring, and is this ultimately
connected to the spill?9 How do the impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
compare to impacts of other environmental stressors like climate change?10
Similar questions have emerged following more recent oil spills. What
is causing the abnormally high mortality of green sea turtles in the Gulf of
Mexico?11 Will the chemical dispersants used to clean up the BP spill have
long-term toxic effects on marine life in the Gulf?12 Is the National
Academy of Sciences correct when, after the Cosco Busan Oil Spill, it

6

See, e.g., S.D. RICE & M.G. CARLS, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND HERRING: AN UPDATED SYNTHESIS
POPULATION DECLINES AND LACK OF RECOVERY 2, 3 (2007), available at http://www.evostc.state.
ak.us/Store/FinalReports/2005-050794-Final.pdf (“Although linkage of the 1993 collapse with the oil
spill cannot be proved or disproved with certainty, reasons for poor recovery since the collapse remain
perplexing.”); id. at 3 (noting the “root causes” why the herring population has failed to recover for the
past thirteen years are unknown).
7
See, e.g., Daniel Esler et al., Cytochrome P4501A Biomarker Indication of Oil Exposure in
Harlequin Ducks up to 20 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 29 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY &
CHEMISTRY 1138 (2010) [hereinafter Harlequin Duck Study] (discussing numerous studies aimed at
understanding whether species in the intertidal zone are exposed to lingering oil).
8
See, e.g., Stanley D. Rice et al., Synthesis of Long-Term Impacts to Pink Salmon Following the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Persistence, Toxicity, Sensitivity, and Controversy, 9 REVS. FISHERIES SCI. 165
(2001) (trustee-funded research suggesting long-term impacts from oil spill). Cf. E.L. Brannon et al.,
Review of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Effects on Pink Salmon in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
20 REVS. FISHERIES SCI. 20, 57 (2012) (Exxon-funded research critiquing trustee-funded studies and
concluding that “pink salmon were not measurably damaged by the Exxon Valdez oil spill”).
9
See Richard E. Thorne & Gary L. Thomas, Herring and the “Exxon Valdez” Oil Spill: An
Investigation into Historical Data Conflicts, 65 ICES J. MARINE SCI. 44, 48 (2008) (discussing the
interrelationship between the decline of sea lions and the Pacific herring fishery collapse four years
after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill).
10
See, e.g., Mark A. Harwell et al., A Conceptual Model of Natural and Anthropogenic Drivers
and Their Influence on the Prince William Sound, Alaska, Ecosystem, 16 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 672 (2010) [hereinafter Conceptual Model] (Exxon-funded research examining the
natural processes, anthropogenic drivers, and resultant stressors that affect Prince William Sound,
including the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill).
11
See Shaila Dewan, Sifting a Range of Suspects as Gulf Wildlife Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010,
at A1. For slideshow images, see The Mystery of the Dead Sea Turtles, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/slideshow/2010/07/14/science/earth/20100715-NECROPSY-1.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2014).
12
For a discussion of the controversial use of dispersants after the BP Gulf Oil Spill, see Robin
Kundis Craig, Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A
Match Made in Hell, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1863, 1865.
OF

478

108:475 (2014)

The Long-Term Tort

concludes “that even relatively small spills can have long-lasting biological
effects”?13
While scientists are only just beginning to examine the potential for
long-term impacts after recent oil spills, the science generated in the
twenty-five year aftermath of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill provides some
guidance. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent studying the
Prince William Sound in the hopes of understanding how the marine
ecosystem responds to an oil spill disaster like the Exxon spill.14 Industry
and government scientists have generated countless studies and data trying
to make sense of a complex ecosystem.15
Through these massive efforts, a new paradigm is emerging in the
scientific literature. Scientists have learned that oil spills, once thought to
cause intense damage only in the weeks or months after the spills, are
tenacious. The oil lingers longer than expected and in more toxic forms
than expected. Long after the media hype has calmed and nonlocal
communities have moved on with their lives, the oil continues to disrupt
ecosystems through sublethal, chronic injuries.
In a world where scientific evidence is mounting, it becomes
increasingly necessary to ask whether the law adequately allows recovery
for long-term natural resource injuries. Theoretically, the answer is yes.
Federal statutes like the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA) allow government trustees to recover natural resource
damages in the wake of oil spills and other toxic releases.16 This special
category of damages is recovered on behalf of the public and must be used
to restore the public resources that were injured by the release.17 Natural

13

Walsh, supra note 2.
In the time between the March 1989 oil spill and the October 1991 natural resource damage
settlement, approximately $100 million was spent to answer two questions: what was injured by the
spill, and how badly? See HUNT, supra note 1, at 193. After the settlement, over $178 million has been
spent for research, monitoring, and general restoration efforts. See EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TR.
COUNCIL, LEGACY OF AN OIL SPILL: 20 YEARS AFTER EXXON VALDEZ 8 (2009), available at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/AnnualStatus/2009AnnualReport.pdf.
This figure does not include the $375 million spent in resource protection through habitat acquisition.
Id.
15
As of December 2008, Exxon Corporation’s bibliography of research related to the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill contained citations to 403 scientific journal articles on research funded by Exxon. See CARRIE
HOLBA, ALASKA RESOURCES LIBRARY & INFO. SERVS., EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: FAQS, LINKS AND
UNIQUE RESOURCES AT ARLIS 2 (2010), available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol2/a/EVOS_FAQs.
pdf.
16
See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2706 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2006).
17
33 U.S.C. § 2706(f); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
14
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resource damages cover a wide range of injuries, both short-term and longterm.18
Theory aside, can government trustees ever truly expect to recover
damages for long-term ecological injuries? After all, long-term injuries
take time to manifest. Practically, many settlements take place before the
full suite of injuries manifests.19 The long latency period also means that
proving a causal link between the oil spill and the later manifested harm
will be difficult. Indeed, the critical obstacle to recovering damages for
long-term injury is causation. This is especially so when the interplay
between exposure pathways, toxicity levels, migratory potential,
intervening environmental stressors, and cascading effects is complicated.
Legal scholars, practitioners, and scientists alike have recognized the
difficulty of meeting traditional causation standards for natural resource
injuries. One government attorney remarked that “[d]iverse risk factors,
poorly understood causative mechanisms, mixtures of multiple toxic
substances, latency in the manifestation of injuries, and a host of other
factors pose impossible proof burdens for plaintiffs under traditional tort
standards of causation-in-fact.”20 Consistent with this observation, other
scholars have described the burden of proving causation in natural resource
damages claims as a “substantial technical barrier to recovery.”21 Likewise,
scientists examining long-term impacts from oil spills readily describe
18

See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(v) (2012) (defining “injury” to include “a measurable adverse change,
either long- or short-term, in the chemical or physical quality or the viability of a natural resource
resulting either directly or indirectly from exposure to a discharge of oil or release of a hazardous
substance or exposure to a product of reactions resulting from the discharge of oil or release of a
hazardous substance”); Craig, supra note 12, at 1884 (“[N]atural resource damages embody a legal
recognition that some forms of pollution, like major oil spills, cause both short-term and long-term
damage to species and ecosystems, that this damage matters to human beings as well as to the
environment, and that this damage involves substantial economic loss, including costs related to
restoration and replacement. Nevertheless, natural resource damages are notoriously difficult to assess
and quantify.”).
19
See, e.g., HUNT, supra note 1, at 179 (“As time passed on, any connection to the spill has grown
more and more faint and, certainly, more difficult to pinpoint and prove.”).
20
Anton P. Giedt, Natural Resource Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Setting
Standards for Causation-of-Injury by Agency Rule-Making, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 375 (1993).
21
James Peck, Measuring Justice for Nature: Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natural
Resources Damages, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 296 (1999); see also DEEP WATER
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 183–84 (“Identifying and quantifying damages, particularly
where complex ecosystems are involved, present enormous challenges. . . . Two sets of
determinations—one concerning the baseline conditions against which damages to each species or
habitat will be assessed and another concerning the quantification of those damages—are particularly
difficult and consequential in terms of overall results.”); Gerald F. George, Litigation of Claims for
Natural Resource Damages (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 22, 1998), WL SC84 ALI-ABA 951, 962
(“Establishing baseline resource conditions, injury, the extent of resulting change in those baseline
conditions, and the causal link between injury and the release is often not easily accomplished. Those
issues have occupied a major part of the debate between trustees and potentially responsible parties in
the promulgation of natural resource damage assessment regulations. Likewise, those issues can
complicate the trustee’s litigation of a natural resource damage case.”).
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long-term effects as “more difficult to recognize and assess, primarily
because different toxicity mechanisms are at work and they do not result in
an immediate and obvious mortality.”22
While many scholars have grappled with causation issues in the area
of toxic torts, and while some commentators have acknowledged the
difficulties of proving causation for natural resource damages, none have
identified the emergence of a new scientific paradigm or given any
significant attention to the causation challenges implicated by proving
long-term ecological harm. Certainly none have undertaken the task of
surveying tort law to offer a solution. This Article provides the academic
foundation for providing a remedy for long-term ecological injuries.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I draws on the scientific
literature to establish the need for a new causal paradigm for proving
natural resource damages. Having established the foreseeability of longterm harms and the inadequacy of the traditional tort paradigm, Part II
assesses the appropriateness of adopting a new causal paradigm in light of
the statutory framework, jurisprudence, and central tenets of tort law.
Part III identifies the core causation challenges that lie at the heart of
proving long-term ecological injuries. Finally, Part IV offers some
solutions by surveying tort law for approaches to situations where latent
injuries take time to manifest and are often influenced by multiple
intervening stressors.
The questions examined in this Article have implications for how
government trustees choose to structure claims for natural resource
damages. One example of how such claims have previously been structured
is the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Government trustees settled the resulting
claims in 1991, less than three years after the Exxon Valdez ran aground on
Bligh Reef. At that time, no one thought significant amounts of oil would
linger in toxic forms; no one expected that fifteen species would still be
listed as unrecovered more than two decades after the spill.23 Certainly no
one anticipated that the Pacific herring fishery would collapse in 1993 and
remain closed for eighteen of the twenty-four years following the spill,
including every year since 1999.24

22

Robert E. Thomas et al., Induction of DNA Strand Breaks in the Mussel (Mytilus trossulus) and
Clam (Protothaca staminea) Following Chronic Field Exposure to Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons
from the Exxon Valdez Spill, 54 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 726, 726 (2007); see also Harlequin Duck
Study, supra note 7 (recognizing that “subtle effects . . . may be difficult to detect in nature”).
23
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TR. COUNCIL, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL RESTORATION PLAN, 2010
UPDATE: INJURED RESOURCES AND SERVICES 7 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 UPDATE], available at
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/universal/documents/publications/2010IRSUpdate.pdf (listing fifteen
species as “recovering,” “not recovering,” or “unknown”).
24
See generally Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 102–07 (2009) (describing collapse and
circumstantial evidence linking Pacific Herring fishery collapse to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill).
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Knowing that they lacked complete information about long-term
injuries, government trustees included a reopener provision in the
settlement agreement for the Exxon Valdez case. The provision allowed
trustees to make an additional one-time demand for then-unknown injuries
sometime between 2002 and 2006. Such reopener provisions are fairly
common in other natural resource damages settlements as well.25 At first
glance, reopener provisions might seem to solve the problem of timing. Not
so. Even if settlements contain reopener provisions that theoretically allow
for additional compensation for long-term injuries, those injuries have to be
proven. In the case of Exxon, trustees have made an almost $100 million
demand for additional damages under the terms of the reopener provision.
These demands have been met mainly with silence and some suggestions
that Exxon will challenge the alleged long-term injuries on causation
grounds.26
In the case of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, the BP Gulf Oil Spill, and
others, trustees will have to understand the limits of what science can prove
in the face of the legal obstacles inherent in the current natural resource
damages framework. Courts are just beginning to struggle with the causal
issues and standards in natural resource damages cases. Only a few have
considered the issue of proving causation for natural resource damages.
Those that have examined the issue have taken a fairly cursory glance and
have not considered long-term injuries or the oil spill context. This Article
fully explores whether a relaxed causal standard would be appropriate and
provides some guidance on how to approach the problem.
Ultimately, this Article recommends adopting a lenient version of the
substantial factor test (termed by some courts as the contributing factor
test), provided that courts clarify the parameters of the test. In particular, a
meaningful and appropriate test would recognize that natural forces
combine with man-made forces to create injuries. Notably, the substantial
factor test should be satisfied by showing that the defendant’s actions
increased the risk of the injury, rather than by proving the precise
biological pathway resulting in the injury.
I. THE NEED FOR A NEW CAUSAL PARADIGM
Long-term injuries following oil spills are of increasing concern.
Scientists studying impacts from large-scale oil spills like the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill have begun to observe that “[i]n contrast to the short-term effects
of crude oil spills, long-term biological impacts are more difficult to
25

See HUNT, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that “reopeners had become a routine part of restoration
settlements”); see also id. at 248–50 (discussing reopener). See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al.,
The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural Resource Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 ALASKA
L. REV. 135 (2005) (providing a detailed history of the reopener).
26
Opposition of Defendants Exxon Corp. et al. to Motion of Richard Steiner for Leave to File
Amicus Curiae Brief at 4, U.S. v. Exxon Corp., No. 3:91-cv-00082-HRH (D. Alaska Feb. 25, 2011).
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recognize but can have serious population and ecosystem impacts.”27
Research after lesser known oil spills like the one in San Francisco Bay is
reaching similar conclusions. To that end, a study published in the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences presented somewhat
surprising findings that even smaller scale spills can have long-lasting
biological effects.28 One researcher remarked: “Based on our previous
understanding of the effects of oil on embryonic fish, we didn’t think there
was enough oil from the Cosco Busan spill to cause this much damage.”29
Concerns about the long-term impact of the BP Gulf Oil Spill have
already drawn much attention from scientists and federal agencies.30 The
Marine Mammal Commission,31 with input from related federal agencies,
released a statement of research needs intended to guide the assessment of
the BP spill’s long-term effects on the Gulf of Mexico.32 Drawing from
emerging science and lessons learned as a result of the Exxon Valdez spill,
the Commission anticipates that “long-term effects are a reasonable
concern for Gulf marine mammals because of the amount of oil spilled, the
quantity of dispersants applied both at the surface and at the wellhead, the
low recovery rates of spilled oil, uncertainty regarding the eventual
disposition of both oil and dispersants, and uncertainty regarding the effects

27

Thomas et al., supra note 22. See generally J. STEVEN PICOU & CECELIA G. MARTIN, LONGTERM COMMUNITY IMPACTS OF THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: PATTERNS OF SOCIAL DISRUPTION AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS SEVENTEEN YEARS AFTER THE DISASTER (2007), available at
http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/B/243478793.pdf (discussing disruptions to subsistence communities in
decade after the spill).
28
John P. Incardona et al., Unexpectedly High Mortality in Pacific Herring Embryos Exposed to
the 2007 Cosco Busan Oil Spill in San Francisco Bay, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E51 (2012).
29
Walsh, supra note 2 (quoting Gary Cherr, coauthor of a National Academy of Sciences study
about long-term biological effects of small oil spills).
30
See, e.g., Jane Lubchenco et al., Science in Support of the Deepwater Horizon Response,
109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20,212, 20,217 (2012) (“Similar to the EVOS spill, some effects may be
unknown or unappreciated for years, if ever.”); Helen K. White et al., Impact of the Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill on a Deep-Water Coral Community in the Gulf of Mexico, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
20,303, 20,306 (2012) (“[I]t is too early to fully evaluate the footprint and long-term effects of acute
and subacute exposure to potential waterborne contaminants resulting from the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill.”). For a short description of various scientific studies underway, see Jeff Smith, Gulf Spill
Pictures: Ten New Studies Show Impact on Coast, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/04/pictures/120420-gulf-oil-spill-impact-studies
/#/deepwater-horizon-small-organism_51859_600x450.jpg.
31
The Marine Mammal Commission is an independent agency of the U.S. federal government that
was created under Title II of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. See 16 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006);
About the Marine Mammal Commission, MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, http://www.mmc.gov/about/
welcome.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
32
MARINE MAMMAL COMM’N, ASSESSING THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE BP DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL ON MARINE MAMMALS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO: A STATEMENT OF RESEARCH
NEEDS 10–11 (2011), available at http://www.mmc.gov/reports/workshop/pdf/longterm_effects_bp_
oilspil.pdf.
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of the spill and response on features of the ecosystem important to marine
mammals.”33
Using the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a case study, this Part begins by
surveying the scientific literature for mounting evidence of long-term
injuries, illustrating why there is a notable shift in the foreseeability of
these injuries. Because foreseeability is central to the proximate cause
inquiry at the heart of tort liability,34 the emerging understanding of longterm impacts ought to change the approach of government trustees in
formulating natural resource damages demands and in the approach of
courts reviewing the viability of those demands. In particular, the increased
foreseeability of long-term harms lends greater support to the idea that
responsible actors be held liable for long-term harms.35
Because liability in tort also turns on one’s ability to prove some
“reasonable connection” between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s
injury36 (causation-in-fact),37 this Part goes on to illustrate why ascertaining
a definitive causal pathway for suspected long-term injury is as
complicated as Mother Nature herself. Finally, having established the
complexity of proving long-term injury as a matter of science, this Part
examines why a traditional causal standard is inappropriate for assessing
long-term natural resource damages.
A. The Foreseeability and Significance of Long-Term Injuries
Extensive scientific studies of the Prince William Sound ecosystem in
the wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill have advanced our understanding of
the breadth and depth of oil spill injuries. Those studies have revealed a

33

Id. at 10 (citation omitted).
See W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 924 (2005) (arguing
that foreseeability “might fit wholly and seamlessly within the elements of breach and proximate
cause”); see also W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 794–804 (2005) (praising
the Restatement (Third) of Torts for proposing to drop foreseeability from the duty element of tort).
35
See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Watershed Moment: Reversals of Tort Theory in the
Nineteenth Century, 2 J. TORT L. 2, 33–36 (2008) (discussing the relationship between foreseeability
and moral accountability in the development of American tort law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 cmt. i (2005) (noting that foreseeability
may be required before imposing strict liability on the theory that disposal of toxic substances is an
abnormally dangerous activity); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 95 (1975) [hereinafter Concerning Cause] (“[T]he general
common law rule that, once proximate cause between defendant’s fault and the injury exists, liability
extends to more serious, but unexpected damages as well, seems to be a good starting point from a
market deterrence point of view.”).
36
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
37
Id. at 263–72.
34
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pattern of chronic, sublethal effects that can plague ecosystems for many
decades.38
Central to this growing body of scientific literature is a series of
breakthrough studies demonstrating the continued presence of Exxon
Valdez oil decades after the spill.39 The first in this series was funded by the
Trustee Council in 2001 and was intended to quantify the extent of oil
residues remaining in Prince William Sound.40 A team of researchers,
headed by scientist Jeffrey Short, surveyed intertidal areas that were
heavily or moderately oiled by the spill.41 After digging more than 9000
pits at 91 sites, researchers found that over half of the sites were still
contaminated with Exxon Valdez oil.42 The degree of oiling ranged “from
light sheening; to oil droplets; to [pits filled with] heavy oil.”43 In 2003,
additional surveys found significant amounts of oil in the lower intertidal
areas.44 Based on the two studies, more than 21,000 gallons of oil were
estimated to remain.45
Not only was the amount of oil significant,46 but also most of the
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) were intact.47 This meant that the

38

For examples of scientific studies that purport to be part of a “growing body of literature,” see
Daniel Esler et al., Cytochrome P4501A Biomarker Indication of the Timeline of Chronic Exposure of
Barrow’s Goldeneyes to Residual Exxon Valdez Oil, 62 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 609, 610 (2011)
[hereinafter Esler, Goldeneyes], and Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7.
39
For a summary of research on oil remaining in Prince William Sound following the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, see NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., REPORT ON RECENT LINGERING OIL
STUDIES (2010) [hereinafter LINGERING OIL], available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/
documents/LingeringOilReport.pdf.
40
The findings were released as a series of three studies. See Jeffrey W. Short et al., Estimate of Oil
Persisting on the Beaches of Prince William Sound 12 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
38 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 19 (2004) [hereinafter Short, Estimate of Oil]; see also Jeffrey W. Short et al.,
Slightly Weathered Exxon Valdez Oil Persists in Gulf of Alaska Beach Sediments After 16 Years,
41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1245 (2007) [hereinafter Short, Slightly Weathered]; Jeffrey W. Short et al.,
Vertical Distribution and Probability of Encountering Intertidal Exxon Valdez Oil on Shorelines of
Three Embayments Within Prince William Sound, Alaska, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3723 (2006)
[hereinafter Short, Vertical Distribution and Probability].
41
Short, Estimate of Oil, supra note 40, at 19.
42
Oil Remains: The Persistence, Toxicity, and Impact of Exxon Valdez Oil, EXXON VALDEZ OIL
SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.cfm?FA=status.lingering (last visited
Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Oil Remains]. “All of the subsurface oil fingerprinted back to the source oil
of the Exxon Valdez.” Id. For an explanation of how oil is fingerprinted, see infra text accompanying
note 107.
43
Oil Remains, supra note 42.
44
Short, Vertical Distribution and Probability, supra note 40, at 3726; see also Oil Remains, supra
note 42.
45
Oil Remains, supra note 42. “Additional surveys outside Prince William Sound have
documented lingering oil also on the Kenai Peninsula and the Katmai coast, over 450 miles away.” Id.
46
“The amount of Exxon Valdez oil remaining substantially exceeds the sum total of all previous
oil pollution on beaches in Prince William Sound, including oil spilled during a 1964 earthquake.” Id.
On the other hand, the original spill released an estimated 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William
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remaining oil was nearly as toxic as the oil collected in the first weeks after
the spill.48 And the lingering oil was not thought to be disappearing anytime
soon. Because the oil was only decreasing at a rate of 0%–4% per year, it
would take decades to disappear entirely.49
Short’s findings rocked the scientific community. The lower half of
the intertidal zone is a “biologically-rich area where mussels, clams and
other marine life are found in greatest abundance.”50 But the fact that oil
remained in this area at toxic levels raised other important questions. After
all, the presence of oil does not necessarily mean that animals were
exposed to the oil. Indeed, one reason the oil lingers is the oil’s location in
remote areas that are not subject to much wave action or disturbance.51
News of persistent oil raised questions about whether the oil was
bioavailable (likely to be absorbed by a living system)52: “[W]ere animals
such as sea otters and harlequin ducks who feed in the intertidal [zone] . . .
being chronically exposed to toxic PAH?”53 To answer that question,
researchers used biomarkers to study whether species like sea otters,
harlequin ducks, and Barrow’s goldeneye are still exposed to the lingering
Exxon Valdez oil.54 In particular, certain genes are expressed in vertebrates
when individuals have been exposed to polycyclic hydrocarbons found in
crude oil. Researchers can identify gene expression by measuring
corresponding levels of enzyme production used to break down the oil.55
Importantly, biomarkers do not indicate whether exposure to oil has
compromised the survival or health of individuals.56 Nonetheless, studies
using biomarkers have confirmed that a number of vertebrates experienced
persistent exposure to Exxon Valdez oil for more than a decade after the
spill.57 Some of those species include harlequin ducks, Barrow’s goldeneye,

Sound. Questions and Answers, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.
ak.us/index.cfm?FA=facts.QA (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
47
See Oil Remains, supra note 42.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
LINGERING OIL, supra note 39, app. at 1 (noting that by 2001 it was known that oil lingered in
Prince William Sound in areas protected by wave disturbance).
52
See Bioavailability Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/bioavailability (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
53
Oil Remains, supra note 42.
54
See LINGERING OIL, supra note 39, app. at 11–17 (assembling and summarizing biomarker
studies undertaken to assess the degree of residual oil impacting various species in Prince William
Sound).
55
Esler, Goldeneyes, supra note 38, at 609.
56
Id.; Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7.
57
The biomarker used is P4501, which is an enzyme whose induction is an indicator of oil
exposure. Esler, Goldeneyes, supra note 38, at 609.

486

108:475 (2014)

The Long-Term Tort

adult pigeon guillemots, river otters, and two species of fish: masked
greenlings and crescent gunnels.58
In the case of harlequin ducks, biomarker studies showed that the
ducks in oiled areas had “unequivocally” higher levels of biomarker
activity as late as 2009, two decades after the spill.59 This finding is
consistent with the harlequin ducks’ life histories and feeding habits.
“Harlequin ducks are marine birds that spend most of their annual cycle in
intertidal and shallow subtidal zones . . . .”60 They are common in Prince
William Sound during nonbreeding season, have a small body size, and
feed on a range of invertebrates found in the intertidal zone, including
amphipods, snails, and polychaetes.61 All of these factors place harlequin
ducks at greater risk of exposure to Exxon Valdez oil than other sea birds
because their behaviors and feeding depend on the very area where
lingering oil is most likely to be found.62
Because biomarkers only measure exposure to oil, scientists have
separately sought to determine whether the exposure to oil is negatively
affecting individuals or populations. Detrimental impacts can be shown by
depressed population numbers, higher incidence of reproductive failure in
oiled areas, or greater incidence of disease in oiled areas.63
For harlequin ducks, exposure to oil translated to identifiable injury at
least a decade after the spill. Consistent with evidence of exposure, they
experienced demographic problems in oiled areas of Prince William
Sound.64 Scientists concluded that “continued exposure to lingering oil was
likely a constraint on population recovery.”65 Indeed, some believe that
more harlequin ducks have died because of chronic exposure to lingering
oil than from acute injuries immediately following the spill.66 Since the
weeks and months following a spill are typically perceived as the period of
highest damage,67 the harlequin duck studies underscore the significance of
long-term injuries on ecosystem recovery.
Like harlequin ducks, sea otters have also been unwilling participants
in discovering the peril of long-term oil spill injuries. While most otter
populations in Prince William Sound have rebounded from the shock of
oiling and spill-related poisoning in the immediate aftermath of the spill,
58

Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7, at 1142.
Id.
60
Id. at 1139.
61
Esler, Goldeneyes, supra note 38, at 612; Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7, at 1139.
62
Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7, at 1139.
63
Id. at 1143.
64
Id. at 1139. In particular, scientists documented “reductions in population trends, densities, and
female survival relative to unoiled areas.” Id. (citations omitted).
65
Id.
66
Esler, Goldeneyes, supra note 38.
67
Id.
59
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some populations continue to suffer.68 The Knight Island population
provides a good example.
The northern end of Knight Island is located just thirty-five miles from
where the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground and is located directly in the
path of the oil.69 Before the Exxon spill, sea otters thrived around northern
Knight Island.70 As of 2000, the otter population was still only about half of
what it had been before the spill.71 While the population appears to have
made progress towards recovery, the 2009 population was still less than
30% of the pre-spill numbers.72 The slow path to recovery is thought to be
caused by continuing exposure to lingering oil: Short’s studies have found
lingering oil in the intertidal zones of Knight Island; biomarker studies
show elevated liver enzymes in sea otters in oiled areas; sea otter behavior
puts them at risk of exposure because they dig pits in the intertidal zone to
search for food; and necropsies of sea otter carcasses found on northern
Knight Island each spring show that mortality has been predominantly in
prime-aged individuals (as opposed to the very young or very old, which is
more typical).73
Related to the issue of how much oil remains in Prince William Sound
and the bioavailability of that oil is the issue of how toxic the lingering oil
is. Post-Exxon studies have analyzed Alaska North Slope crude oil to
68

Oil Remains, supra note 42.
Janet Raloff, Otters and Oil: Problems Remain, SCI. NEWS (Mar. 25, 2009, 8:18 AM),
https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/science-public/otters-and-oil-problems-remain.
70
Scientists estimate that a population of about 165 sea otters inhabited northern Knight Island
before the spill. J.L. BODKIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
TRENDS IN SEA OTTER POPULATION ABUNDANCE IN WESTERN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA:
PROGRESS TOWARD RECOVERY FOLLOWING THE 1989 EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 12 (2011).
71
Id. at 11 (estimating the population in 2000 to be seventy-nine otters).
72
Id. at 13 (noting that the population in 2009 was about 116 otters as compared to 165 otters
before the spill); id. (concluding that the upward trend since 2003 puts the otters on a path to recovery).
73
See James L. Bodkin et al., Long-Term Effects of the ‘Exxon Valdez’ Oil Spill: Sea Otter
Foraging in the Intertidal as a Pathway of Exposure to Lingering Oil, 447 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGRESS SERIES 273, 284 (2012) (“The overlap of lingering oil in the intertidal with intertidal
foraging by sea otters provides a reasonable explanation for their slow population recovery.”); see also
J.L. Bodkin & B.E. Ballachey, Sea Otter: Enhydra Lutris, RESTORATION NOTEBOOK (Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill Tr. Council, Anchorage, Alaska), Nov. 1997, at 5, available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/
Universal/Documents/Publications/RestorationNotebook/RN_seaotter.pdf; J.L. Bodkin et al., Sea Otter
Population Status and the Process of Recovery from the 1989 ‘Exxon Valdez’ Oil Spill, 241 MARINE
ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 237 (2002), available at http://www.int-res.com/articles/meps2002/241/
m241p237.pdf; JAMES L. BODKIN ET AL., PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF POPULATION CHANGE IN
SELECTED NEARSHORE VERTEBRATE PREDATORS: RESTORATION PROJECT 030423 FINAL REPORT 15
(2003); Raloff, supra note 69. For counterstudies and counterexplanations regarding the sea otter’s
plight, see Mark A. Harwell et al., A Quantitative Ecological Risk Assessment of the Toxicological Risks
from Exxon Valdez Subsurface Oil Residues to Sea Otters at Northern Knight Island, Prince William
Sound, Alaska, 16 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 727, 727 (2010) (concluding that
“maximum-exposed sea otters would not receive a dose of PAHs sufficient to cause any health effects;
consequently, no plausible toxicological risk exists to the sea otter subpopulation at [Northern Knight
Island]”).
69
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assess its chemical makeup and toxicity as time elapses.74 The results buck
the conventional wisdom that weathered oil is less toxic and less
bioavailable than freshly spilled oil. While weathered oil does not release
toxins into the environment as readily as freshly spilled oil does, the
chemical compounds that are released from weathered oil are more toxic.75
In other words, lower doses of weathered oil are required to elicit a
damaging response.76 Still, how the toxins from weathered oil cause
damage is also not as well understood. Scientists are beginning to discover
that different PAH compounds released from oil operate through unique
toxic pathways.77 This means that as time elapses, toxic pathways and
potential impacts from oil could fan out over the ecosystem, making it
increasingly difficult to gauge the harms caused by an oil spill.78
Some long-term impacts from the Exxon spill are unrelated to
lingering oil. For instance, two killer whale pods in Prince William Sound
are examples of how acute injuries caused by oil spills can have permanent
and devastating consequences.79 In the case of the AB pod, a grouping of
resident killer whales, thirteen members died as a result of the spill,
including reproducing females.80 Because many of the animals that were
killed were juveniles and females, and because of whales’ slow
reproductive cycles, it could take decades for the AB pod to recover, in
74

RICE & CARLS, supra note 6, ch. 1; see also John P. Incardona et al., Cardiac Arrhythmia Is the
Primary Response of Embryonic Pacific Herring (Clupea Pallasi) Exposed to Crude Oil During
Weathering, 43 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 201 (2009) (studying the impacts of weathered crude oil on herring
embryos to explain long-term impacts of the Exxon spill on the herring fishery collapse).
75
See RICE & CARLS, supra note 6, at 1.6.
76
See id. at 1.6–1.8; see also Ernest L. Brannon et al., Risk of Weathered Residual Exxon Valdez
Oil to Pink Salmon Embryos in Prince William Sound, 26 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY & CHEMISTRY 780,
780–81 (2007) (presenting studies on pink salmon embryos suggesting a new chronic toxicity exposure
paradigm).
77
John P. Incardona et al., Aryl Hydrocarbon Receptor-Independent Toxicity of Weathered Crude
Oil During Fish Development, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1755, 1761 (2005), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1315066/ (noting that “[b]ecause different PAHs act on
fish embryos via independent toxic mechanisms, understanding the cumulative toxicity of PAH
mixtures will be more challenging than previously appreciated”).
78
Id. A similar example can be found in the breakdown of pesticides in groundwater into daughter
products. See Breakdown Products of Widely Used Pesticides Are Acutely Lethal to Amphibians, Study
Finds, SCI. DAILY (June 25, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/06/070623213748.htm.
79
For a succinct description of the killer whale story and its implications, see Stanley D. Rice,
Persistence, Toxicity, and Long-Term Environmental Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 55, 58–59 (2009), noting that “[k]iller whale losses from the acute initial exposures are
examples of the length of time for recovery of long-lived species with low reproductive rates.” See also
Killer Whales, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/index.
cfm?FA=status.orca (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); Janet Raloff, Exxon Valdez Killed Future for Some
Killer Whales, SCI. NEWS (Mar. 26, 2009, 7:46 AM), https://www.sciencenews.org/node/5170.
80
See C.O. Matkin et al., Ongoing Population-Level Impacts on Killer Whales Orcinus Orca
Following the ‘Exxon Valdez’ Oil Spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 356 MARINE ECOLOGY
PROGRESS SERIES 269, 273, 275 (2008).
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contrast to the twelve years originally estimated.81 Like the AB pod, the
AT-1 Group of transient killer whales continues to suffer from the acute
losses following the spill. To be sure, the group was already facing
challenges before the spill, with a population of only twenty-two.82 After
the spill, however, there are only thirteen remaining individuals and the
Group has lost any hope of recovery.83 This long-term harm is most
accurately described as an acceleration of a previously adverse trend.84
On the whole, these trends of persistent injury decades after the Exxon
spill can be understood by reviewing the latest status report released by the
Exxon Valdez Trustee Council.85 That report summarizes the recovery
status of the original list of thirty-two species and resources that were
injured as a result of the spill. The list is not exhaustive of species that were
injured but is representative of the greater ecosystem’s road to recovery.86
After more than two decades, only thirteen species have recovered (or are
“very likely recovered”).87 Ten other species are listed as “recovering,”88 a
notoriously ambiguous category ranging from species that are almost
recovered to those that barely pass the “not recovering” mark.89 Ecosystem
services including commercial fishing, passive use, tourism, and
subsistence have not yet recovered but are categorized as “recovering.”90
Most notably, some keystone species like the Pacific herring are listed as
not recovering at all.91
B. The Complicated Task of Proving Long-Term Injury
The post-Exxon research regarding long-term consequences of the
spill illustrates that government trustees need to take steps to capture or
preserve claims for long-term injuries. Long-term injuries do exist and they
exist to a greater extent and magnitude than previously understood. The
growing body of literature documenting long-term injuries strengthens the
demands that trustees can make for natural resource damages. The
mounting scientific evidence of long-term injuries means that these types

81

Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 279.
83
Id. (noting that the AT-1 Group “will likely go extinct within the next several decades”).
84
Id. (noting one lesson learned from the AT-1 Group is that “a major environmental perturbation
can greatly hasten the decline toward extinction”); see also Raloff, supra note 79 (Craig Matkin is
quoted as saying, “I don’t want to make it sound like the oil spill is solely responsible for AT-1’s
decline . . . . It just exacerbated an already bad situation.”).
85
See 2010 UPDATE, supra note 23.
86
Id. at 1.
87
Id. at 7.
88
Id.
89
See HUNT, supra note 1, at 170–72.
90
2010 UPDATE, supra note 23.
91
Id. at 7, 27.
82
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of injuries are now foreseeable. Legally, this is significant given the role
that foreseeability plays in the proximate cause inquiry.92
The Exxon studies also illustrate that determining the long-term
consequences of a spill is a tremendous undertaking that requires many
coordinated research studies to flesh out a potential causal pathway.
Funding that kind of research effort is costly. Since the trustees settled their
natural resource damages claims with Exxon in 1991, they have allocated
$178 million of the settlement funds to general research and monitoring in
the Prince William Sound area.93 These expenses only slightly exceed the
$176.5 million spent by state and federal trustees on injury assessment and
litigation efforts in the two-and-a-half years leading up to the settlement.94
Because long-term study of oil spills is costly, trustees may not always be
able to fund the research necessary to uncover problems.
The study of the Exxon spill might be the best-case scenario in terms
of trustees being in the position to make demands for long-term natural
resource damages. This is so because the large natural resource damages
settlement came relatively quickly after the spill and supplied the necessary
funds to engage in extensive and ongoing study of Prince William Sound.
Even so, recovering for long-term injuries is more complicated than simply
funding studies and making demands. There are limits to even well-funded
science. Chiefly, there is the simple fact that nature is complicated.
Ecosystems are dynamic, complex, and varied in time and space.95
Unraveling the mysteries of nature makes measuring the full extent and
magnitude of oil-induced injuries more an exercise in rough justice than
precision mathematics.
For example, the ecosystem in Prince William Sound is home to
hundreds of species and many different habitat types, all interacting as part
of a complex structure.96 That structure, those species, and the habitats are
all reacting to numerous biological, chemical, and physical processes aside
from oil. Global climate conditions and weather patterns impact the cycles

92

See supra text accompanying notes 34 and 35; see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF
TORTS § 198, at 681–83 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that proximate cause is the judicial tool used to cut
off liability for policy reasons when the causal chain becomes too attenuated to justify imposition of
liability).
93
LEGACY OF AN OIL SPILL, supra note 14.
94
Id.
95
See, e.g., Mark A. Harwell & John H. Gentile, Ecological Significance of Residual Exposures
and Effects from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 2 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & MGMT. 204, 204
(2006) [hereinafter Ecological Significance] (“Ecosystems are complex, diverse, dynamic, spatially and
temporally variable, and continuously subject to a plethora of natural and anthropogenic stressors.”).
96
Conceptual Model, supra note 10, at 673 (citation omitted) (“[T]he [Gulf of Alaska] constitutes a
highly productive ecosystem that sustains immense populations of seabirds, marine mammals, and
fishes.”); see also Ecological Significance, supra note 95, at 206 (cataloging confounding factors
influencing ecological changes in Prince William Sound).
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of nutrient upwelling in the nearshore areas of Prince William Sound.97
Other chemical and physical factors like water currents and salinity also
influence nutrient availability.98 This in turn implicates the physical
characteristics of the ocean bottoms and shorelines.99
When climate patterns alter nutrient availability, the impact cascades
throughout the ecosystem. A change in nutrients, for example, influences
the productivity of phytoplankton, which are the food base for forage fish
like the Pacific herring and sand lance.100 Those forage fish and other
planktivores are the energy bridge to higher trophic levels. They utilize the
energy from nutrients and provide fatty, high-energy foods for their
predators, including larger fish, mammals, and sea birds.101 It is because of
this complex structure that populations of species undergo natural
variations driven by any number of these dynamic influences.
The study of the Prince William Sound ecosystem beautifully
illustrates that ecological complexity creates scientific challenges to
recovering damages for long-term ecological injuries. It demonstrates the
difficulty in proving causation due to lack of baseline data, natural
variability, and problems of multiple stressors and multiple sources.
Consider, for instance, the problem of multiple sources. When
scientific studies suggest that polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) are
bioavailable in the Prince William Sound ecosystem, one possible
explanation is that the hydrocarbons are unrelated to the Exxon spill.102
Hydrocarbons are not exactly novel in marine coastal environments.
Natural, background sources of hydrocarbons in Prince William Sound
come from eroding shale and natural oil seeps along the northern coast of
the Gulf of Alaska.103 Another significant release of hydrocarbons into
Prince William Sound came from fuel oil and asphalt during the 1964
earthquake.104 Human-derived sources of oil include incremental releases
from cruise liners, fishing fleets, and oil tankers. Historical industrial sites
are also thought to contribute to the hydrocarbons in Prince William
Sound.105 Then there are the more diffuse sources that can hardly be pinned
on any particular location or single activity—hydrocarbons from

97

Conceptual Model, supra note 10, at 710 (“Climate processes also have an important role in
generating the stressors of physical disturbance, disease (e.g., viral hemorrhagic septicemia, VHS), and
introduced species (e.g., species entering the system from warmer climates in response to global climate
change).”).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 682.
101
Id.
102
Ecological Significance, supra note 95, at 209–10.
103
Id. at 209.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 210.
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atmospheric deposition of burning coal, forest fires, and global industrial
sources.106
To deal with the problem of multiple possible sources, scientists have
devised a system of hydrocarbon fingerprinting.107 The Exxon Valdez oil,
for example, is a mixture of crude oils from the North Slope of Alaska and
contains an identifiable chemical makeup of PAHs.108 This chemical
makeup is the “fingerprint.” Based on the types of PAHs that characterize
the fingerprint, scientists can identify an appropriate biomarker that would
indicate exposure of marine species to a particular source. For example,
members of the cytochrome P450 1 gene family are strongly expressed
when an individual has been exposed to the larger PAHs like those found in
crude oil from the North Slope.109 This biomarker has been used to study
the exposure of marine species to Exxon Valdez oil in Prince William
Sound.110
Assuming that the source of oil can be determined through PAH
fingerprinting, however, there is still a problem of multiple stressors.
Researchers must determine whether the ecosystem is experiencing
difficulty with system-wide recovery because the PAHs associated with
Exxon Valdez oil are wreaking chronic, sublethal havoc. Or, is it the
combined stress from multiple sources of hydrocarbons that is sending the
ecosystem over the edge? Nonhydrocarbon stressors add to the
complication of identifying the principle reason for ailing populations.111
Climate change, for instance, is warming oceans worldwide and altering
sea-ice habitats in ways that have profound effects on marine species.112
Some scientists have suggested that the changes caused in Prince William
Sound due to hydrocarbon stressors pale in comparison to the natural
variability of climate and other oceanographic processes that affect ocean
resources.113
Mother Nature’s alternative explanations keep coming. In 1993, the
Pacific herring fishery collapsed, and it has yet to recover.114 Before the
spill, commercial herring fisheries experienced record numbers. After the
spill, the fishery collapsed and has remained closed for fifteen of the last
106

Id. at 209.
For an explanation of hydrocarbon fingerprinting, see A.E. Bence & W.A. Burns,
Fingerprinting Hydrocarbons in the Biological Resources of the Exxon Valdez Spill Area, in FATE AND
EFFECTS, supra note 1, at 84.
108
Id. at 92.
109
Id.; see also Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7.
110
See Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7.
111
See Conceptual Model, supra note 10, at 690–712 (modeling the relative influence of natural
drivers and hydrocarbon sources on the marine resources in Prince William Sound).
112
Scott C. Doney et al., Climate Change Impacts on Marine Ecosystems, 4 ANN. REV. MARINE
SCI. 11, 14–16 (2012) (assembling the literature and cataloging impacts on climate change on oceans).
113
Conceptual Model, supra note 10, at 712.
114
See Knudsen, supra note 24; Rice, supra note 79, at 65.
107
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twenty-one years. Some scientific studies suggest that the 1993 collapse of
the Pacific herring fishery is related to the Exxon spill.115 A common
counterexplanation is natural variability116—herring populations worldwide
are known to experience boom and bust cycles. The theory is that nature is
simply doing what nature always does and the herring will return in time.
Though attractive for its ease and optimism, this explanation does not
necessarily explain why the herring populations in unoiled areas of Prince
William Sound have rebounded since the spill while those in oiled areas
continue to struggle.
Even if counterexplanations were fully explored and understood, yet
another possibility is that several stressors acting together are responsible
for the harms. The combination of stressors might be greater than the sum
of its parts. In this way, multiple stressors might function synergistically to
magnify harm to the ecosystem.117
This synergistic potential of toxic stressors means that lingering Exxon
Valdez oil might not generate ecologically significant impacts if it were
acting alone. If synergistic models were well understood, however,
scientists might find that lingering oil could be responsible for (or at least
contribute to) sending an already-stressed ecosystem into decline. For
example, a population already experiencing increased susceptibility to
disease as a result of warming oceans might succumb to that susceptibility
if added toxins further weaken immune systems.118 Or, a population already
experiencing natural die-offs might be unable to rebound from the stress of
a catastrophic event (e.g., killer whales in Prince William Sound).119
As if the complexity of multiple sources, natural variability, and
synergistic complications were not enough, at least three other problems
are wrapped up in the detection of long-term injuries. One problem has to
do with knowing when a resource is injured and the others have to do with
when it has recovered. First, as a practical matter, long-term injuries are
generally detected in the course of monitoring the recovery of injured
resources. After the Exxon spill, the Trustee Council identified twenty115

Knudsen, supra note 24.
Ecological Significance, supra note 95, at 225–26 (attributing the sustained population loss of
herring in Prince William Sound to “large natural interannual variability”).
117
Conceptual Model, supra note 10, at 703 (“[A] population or biological process might be
marginally stressed by the influence of a single stressor. If, however, an additional stressor is added
concurrently, the combined effects of both might have more significant consequences on the population.
Thus, the effects of stressors might not be simply additive but combine nonlinearly.”).
118
See id. at 710 (climate change increases incidence of disease in oceans); Evelyn D. Brown &
Mark G. Carls, Pacific Herring (Clupea Pallasi), RESTORATION NOTEBOOK (Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Tr.
Council, Anchorage, Alaska), Sept. 1998, at 4, available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/
Documents/Publications/RestorationNotebook/RN_herring.pdf (suggesting that there is a higher
incidence of disease among herring populations because immune systems were depressed by oil
exposure).
119
See discussion of killer whales supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
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eight injured resources to monitor and study to determine long-term effects
of the spill.120 Certainly many more resources were injured,121 but not all
resources can be studied after a spill.122 As a result, long-term injuries (or
even shorter term injuries) can be missed. Some scientists studying the
Exxon spill, for example, lament the failure to study the forage fish such as
the sand lance.123 As described above, the forage fish are the trophic link
between plankton and larger fish and marine mammals. Understanding the
impact of the spill on keystone species like the sand lance or the Pacific
herring might have gone a long way towards understanding the cascading
effects of the spill to higher trophic levels like sea otters or sea lions.124
Even when species are studied, determining when an injured species
has recovered is also not straightforward. Under federal regulations
governing the natural resource damage assessment process, trustees are
supposed to use monetary damages to “restore” the injured resources.125
This means returning the ecosystem to pre-spill conditions.126 Given that
ecosystems are constantly evolving and being acted upon by multiple
natural and anthropogenic stressors, some commenters have suggested that
returning to a defined state is not a realistic measure of recovery.127 The
reason is that the baseline for recovery of ecosystems shifts over time.128
When ecosystem health is a moving target, the identification of injury by
comparing present conditions to the past is not always useful.
Even if ecosystems could return to baseline, that standard for recovery
presumes the existence of baseline information. Baseline data provides a
basis for comparing pre- and post-spill population trends.129 It gives clues
as to natural fluctuations in the oiled and unoiled areas. It helps predict
which species are doing well, which ones were stressed to start, and in
general whether the ecosystem is balanced.130 The process of narrowing
down the root causes of ecological injuries would be easier if scientists had
120

See 2010 UPDATE, supra note 23.
Id. at 1.
122
HUNT, supra note 1, at 162 (noting that the restoration process is biased from the start because
only the resources on the original list benefit from direct intervention, study, and restoration efforts).
123
Id. at 55.
124
See id.
125
See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2006).
126
OPA regulations define “recovery” as “the return of injured natural resources and services to
baseline,” which in turn means “the condition of the natural resources and services that would have
existed had the incident not occurred.” 15 C.F.R § 990.30 (2012).
127
HUNT, supra note 1, at 164.
128
Id.
129
See 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (allowing trustees to use “historical data, reference data, control data, or
data on incremental changes” to establish the baseline).
130
For an extensive discussion of case studies highlighting the benefits of baseline data, see Usha
Varanasi, Making Science Useful in Complex Political and Legal Arenas: A Case for Frontloading
Science in Anticipation of Environmental Changes to Support Natural Resource Laws and Policies,
3 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 242–54 (2013).
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better and more baseline data.131 Pre-spill population data, however, often
does not exist.132 Gathering data is costly and there is no systematic
collection of baseline data by government or industry.133
In the case of Exxon, baseline data existed for some species associated
with commercial fisheries (e.g., salmon or herring) or of particular interest
to the public (e.g., bald eagles or sea lions). But for many species pre-spill
data was limited (e.g., cormorants) or nonexistent (e.g., Pacific sand
lance).134 In the days following the spill, scientists were left scrambling to
gather what baseline data they could before oil hit the shore.135 This is no
way to ascertain meaningful population trends. At least one commentator,
drawing on reports from the Trustee Council, concluded that “[t]he lack of
baseline data would become, over time, the single greatest obstacle to
understanding the degree of injury suffered by individual species as well as
measuring their ability to bounce back.”136
To summarize the complexity of this situation, one might return to the
point made earlier—that measuring the extent and magnitude of long-term
injuries caused by environmental disasters like the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
is not an exercise in precision mathematics. Multiple sources of harm,
synergistic effects, natural variability, lack of baseline understanding of the
ecosystem to start, and overarching system pressures like climate change
all provide ready-made counterexplanations to claims of long-term injuries.
C. Ruling Out a Traditional “But-For” Approach to Causation
On the one hand, science supports the notion that long-term injuries
following oil spills are foreseeable and likely to be significant. On the other
hand, injuries manifest in an environment with multiple stressors and
intervening forces that combine to make causal pathways indirect and often
uncertain. Together, these observations challenge us to consider whether
existing legal frameworks can adequately remedy long-term harm caused
131

See Ecological Significance, supra note 95, at 222 (acknowledging that cormorants have not
recovered after the Exxon spill but concluding that lack of baseline data makes it difficult to assess
whether depressed populations are a result of the spill).
132
Usha Varanasi, Frontloading the Science in Anticipation of Environmental Disasters,
37 FISHERIES 233, 233 (2012) (discussing frequent lack of “standardized and robust baseline
information available about the state of the environment where the spill or storm may cause serious
damage”); see also KRISTINA ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41396, THE 2010 OIL SPILL:
NATIONAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT UNDER THE OIL POLLUTION ACT 8 (2010), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41396.pdf (“It is not practical to expect to have up-to-date baseline data for
every species everywhere there might be an oil spill.”).
133
See id.
134
2010 UPDATE, supra note 23, at 6 (“For many of the resources affected by the spill there was
limited or no recent data on their status in 1989.”); Ecological Significance, supra note 95, at 222
(discussing lack of baseline data for cormorants).
135
HUNT, supra note 1, at 56–57.
136
Id. at 57 & n.25.
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by oil spills. Under a traditional causal standard, the answer is almost
certainly no.
Notably, traditional causal standards are not the only approaches that
tort law has to offer. Indeed, the complex causation problems raised by
long-term natural resource damages are not new to tort law. Part II
examines the myriad ways tort law has evolved and adapted to address
complex causal problems, particularly in the toxic tort context. Before
jumping to tort law’s flexibility, however, it is worth considering why such
flexibility is needed here. In other words, it is worth reviewing what
traditional causal standards would require and why such standards would
be an inappropriate default for the challenges of proving long-term natural
resource damages. This is particularly the case given that many courts,
even when moving away from traditional causal standards, retain some of
the problematic language that might otherwise be inappropriate in the
natural resource damages context.
At the most basic level, traditional causation requires plaintiffs to
prove causation-in-fact and satisfy the limits of proximate cause.137
Roughly speaking, causation-in-fact asks whether the alleged conduct
actually caused any injury.138 This component of the causal inquiry is
focused on distilling facts. Did the Exxon Valdez oil play a role in the
herring fishery collapse? Answering this question will be guided by
scientific inquiry.139 Ultimately, though, the question may not be
answerable through direct evidence. Rather, circumstantial evidence (such
as the timing of the collapse relative to the timing of the spill) might be the
only evidence available.
Under traditional formulations, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
that tortious conduct is a “but-for” cause of the alleged injury.140 In many
cases, the but-for test works smoothly and efficiently at identifying the
tortious actor. In the case of oil spills like Exxon, many acute injuries are
readily identifiable using the but-for test. For example, it was not hard to
ascertain that but for the Exxon Valdez running aground Bligh Reef and
spilling 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound, there would
not have been 871 oiled sea otter carcasses collected in the spill area in the
days following the accident.141 Likewise, but for the spill the commercial
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DOBBS, supra note 92, § 198, at 681–82.
Id. § 183, at 614.
139
Id. at 615.
140
David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1997)
(“The most widely accepted test for making [the cause-in-fact] inquiry is the but-for test.”); see also
DOBBS, supra note 92, § 186, at 623 (“Under the but-for test, the defendant’s conduct is a factual cause
of the plaintiff’s harm if, but-for the defendant’s conduct, that harm would not have occurred.”).
141
See Sea Otters, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/
index.cfm?FA=status.seaotter (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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salmon fisheries would not have been closed for the 1989 and 1990
seasons.142
In a number of cases, however, including those most likely to arise in
the context of long-term natural resource injuries, the but-for test fails to
hold tortious actors liable.143 In particular, where there are multiple causes
capable of giving rise to a single injury, the but-for test may not be satisfied
by any of the contributing causes.144 For example, one of the pods of
transient killer whales (the AT-1 Group) will never recover from the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill and will slowly go extinct.145 One cause of that prognosis
is the oil spill. But that is not the whole story. The pod had been suffering
declines before the spill, possibly due to a diminished food base and
exposure to other reproduction-inhibiting pollutants.146 In this situation, the
but-for test would not identify Exxon as an actual cause of extinction.
Scientists cannot say that but for the Exxon spill, the AT-1 Group would
not be facing certain extinction. Scientists can only say that the Exxon spill
contributed to the acceleration and certainty of that extinction.147 In that
situation, no single cause necessarily satisfies the but-for test because there
are alternative causes that might have given rise to the injury.
Another problem with the but-for test in the long-term natural resource
damages context is that it can be applied only by comparing what happened
with a hypothetical alternative148—it requires some sense of what would
have happened absent the release of oil or toxics into the environment.
While this counterfactual inquiry is speculative by nature (e.g., exactly
what would have happened if the defendant had not run a red light is
ultimately unknowable in a metaphysical sense), for many situations we
have built up sufficient intuitions from life experience to make reasonable
guesses and temper the speculation.149 For that reason, it is sometimes said,
“any layman is quite as competent” to answer ordinary cause-in-fact
questions as “the most experienced court.”150 The same may not be true in
142

See Commercial Fishing, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, http://www.evostc.state.
ak.us/index.cfm?FA=status.human_fishing (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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See DOBBS, supra note 92, §§ 186, 187, 189, at 624–26, 631–36.
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For a description of alternative liability theory, which addresses the problem of multiple causes,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) (“Where the conduct of two or more actors is
tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to plaintiff by only one of them, but there is
uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.”).
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See discussion supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
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Kyle Hopkins, Debate Persists About Long-Term Effects of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.adn.com/2009/02/06/682335/debate-persistsabout-long-term.html.
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See Matkin, supra note 80, at 279.
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DOBBS, supra note 92, § 187, at 626–28.
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See Robertson, supra note 140, at 1769 (“All of these but-for inquires call upon common
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Id. at 1765 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 41 at 237 (4th ed. 1971)).
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the context of long-term natural resource damages. For long-term injuries,
neither laymen nor scientists might be able to offer a plausible guess as to
what the state of the environment would have looked like absent the Exxon
spill. They might not be able to say what the marine ecosystem would have
done in a vacuum. Scientists have a hard enough time discerning the
science of what is actually happening, let alone what might happen many
years in the future.
Legal scholars, practitioners, and scientists have recognized that
traditional causation standards might not be a good fit for natural resource
injuries.151 The fit may be even worse for long-term injuries. To that end,
scientists examining long-term impacts from oil spills readily described
long-term effects as “more difficult to recognize and assess, primarily
because different toxicity mechanisms are at work and they do not result in
an immediate and obvious mortality.”152
The challenge, it would seem, is finding an appropriate causal
paradigm—one that provides more than a theoretical opportunity for
holding responsible parties liable for long-term impacts and yet is
sufficiently discerning so as to uphold notions of fairness underlying tort
law. This challenge has been considered in the toxic torts literature with
respect to latent injuries,153 but remains surprisingly unexamined for longterm natural resource damages. Taking up that challenge is the subject of
the remainder of this Article.
II. ASSESSING THE SPACE FOR A NEW CAUSAL PARADIGM
Before seeking out an alternate causal paradigm befitting the
complexity of proving long-term injuries, one might first ask what room
exists in the legal framework for adopting a nontraditional path. To that
end, this Part begins by considering tort law’s ability to address complex
causal questions like those raised by long-term natural resource damages.
This Part goes on to examine the statutory framework and its requirements
for proving causation. Next, this Part surveys the limited jurisprudence in
which courts have attempted to articulate a standard for causation in the
natural resource damages context. Finally, this Part comes full circle to tort
and considers whether a relaxed causation paradigm fits the central tenets
of tort law.
In the end, this Part concludes that room does exist for considering an
alternate causal paradigm—in fact there is substantial need for clarity in
151

See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text; see also Robert L. Rabin, Environmental
Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 27, 29–32 (1987) (noting that “[t]raditional tests of
causal responsibility—the but-for principle, substantial factor causation, pro rata joint-and-several
liability—are operating in foreign territory when they are employed in [environmental tort] cases”).
152
Thomas et al., supra note 22; see also Harlequin Duck Study, supra note 7 (recognizing that
“subtle effects . . . may be difficult to detect in nature”).
153
See infra Parts II.A, IV.B.
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this unsettled area. Only a small handful of courts have grappled with the
causal standard for proving ordinary natural resource injuries, and none
have expressly considered long-term injuries.154 The courts that have
considered the issue diverge in the degree to which traditional tort
paradigms should govern the causation inquiry in natural resource damages
law. This issue could greatly benefit from some clarification and additional
analysis.
A. Room Within Tort Law
The complicated questions of causation raised by long-term ecological
harm are not new to tort law. Time and time again, tort law has proven
itself perfectly comfortable with evolving to handle nontraditional
problems in a variety of contexts. The most notable evidence of tort law’s
flexibility is the well-accepted deviation away from the rigid but-for test
and the now widespread preference for the more intuitive substantial factor
test.155 A classic statement of the substantial factor test might provide:
[W]here two or more causes have concurred to bring about an event, and any
one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical
result, “the defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.”156

Early cases restricted the application of the substantial factor test to
multiple tortious actors, where the negligence of more than one person
combined to cause harm.157 Courts later expanded the substantial factor test
to cases where forces of unknown origin combined with tortious conduct to
cause harm.158 In particular, in the classic tort case of Anderson v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.,159 the defendant negligently started a
bog fire that swept over a large area and eventually merged with another
fire of independent and uncertain origin. The combined fires burned the
plaintiff’s property and the defendant was held liable.160 Important for the
purposes of natural resource injuries, the “twin fires” case established that
154

See infra Part II.C.
DOBBS, supra note 92, § 189, at 631–36; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 36, § 41,
at 268 (recognizing test as more intuitive than the rigid but-for test).
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ITT Indus., Inc. v. Borgwarner, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 848, 876 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (quoting
Artesian Water Co. v. Gov’t of New Castle Cnty., 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 (D. Del. 1987) (providing
an example of this classic statement and application of the test)); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 461, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the need to
show that “each individual defendant’s contribution, taken alone, would have caused an injury” as the
defining feature of the substantial factor test (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 2d. 310, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
157
Robertson, supra note 140, at 1779 & n.57.
158
See id.
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179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
160
Id. at 46.
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the substantial factor test applies regardless of whether the multiple causes
are natural or man-made.161
These classic versions of the substantial factor test are uniformly
considered a legitimate departure from the traditional but-for test and often
used to handle more complex questions of causation.162 Indeed, courts that
have grappled with setting the proper causal standard for natural resource
damages claims have considered adopting the substantial factor test. Some
have adopted the test while others have rejected it for an even more flexible
version called the contributing factor test.163
In addition to the emergence of the substantial factor test to address
combined causes, similarly innovative doctrines have been created to
handle problems of concurrent causes. In the classic case of Summers v.
Tice,164 the court adopted a burden-shifting framework to deal with
concurrent causes. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when two hunters
negligently shot in his direction. Under the circumstances, it could not be
determined which of the two negligent defendants had actually caused the
injury.165 Recognizing that the plaintiff might be without any remedy under
traditional causal paradigm, the Supreme Court of California held both
defendants jointly and severally liable. The burden of proof shifted to the
defendants to absolve themselves of liability if they could.166
Tort law’s agility in handling complex problems of causation
continues in the modern context. For instance, in cases involving medical
malpractice claims, courts have assigned liability where the defendant
caused an increased risk of harm to the plaintiff or, more often, reduced the
plaintiff’s chance of survival.167 In those cases, courts recognize the
uncertain and speculative nature of predicting what the likely outcome
would have been but for the medical malpractice.168 Nevertheless, courts
impose liability to avoid systematic avoidance of liability by physicians in
these cases.169 A similar risk-of-injury approach might be fitting to longterm ecological harms, where the counterfactual inquiry is equally
uncertain and yet the tortious actor’s role in increasing the likelihood of
harm is fairly clear.

161

See Robertson, supra note 140, at 1777–78 (describing combined forces test and noting that one
force operates independent of any wrongdoing by the defendant).
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See id. at 1776–78.
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See infra Part II.C.
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199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
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Id. at 2–3.
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Id. at 3–5.
167
See infra notes 337–45, and accompanying text for a discussion of the risk-of-injury analysis in
the medical malpractice cases.
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See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 477–78 (Wash. 1983)
(en banc) (discussing the difficulty of applying a counterfactual inquiry to a medical malpractice case).
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Id. at 477.
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In addition to the risk-of-injury cases, several innovations have been
adopted in the area of toxic torts to deal with problems of proving causation
for latent, long-term health injuries. Such issues were at the heart of cases
like asbestos litigation, tobacco litigation, Agent Orange litigation, and
others.170 Indeed, there is a rich body of toxic tort literature discussing
problems of proof and seeking out alternate causal frameworks for
difficult-to-prove latent injuries.171
The degree to which specific doctrines in toxic tort can adequately
address similarly complex causal problems in the natural resource damages
context requires closer examination and is an issue that will be taken up
more fully in Part IV. For now, it is simply worth recognizing that difficultto-prove causal problems emerge regularly in tort law. The toxic tort cases
and others provide ample examples of how tort law has adapted and
demonstrated its virtue as a flexible tool.
B. Room Within the Statutory Framework
If tort law possesses the inherent flexibility needed to tackle emerging
causal issues in the natural resource damages context, can the existing
statutory framework accommodate such innovative potential? Consider that
three major federal congressional statutes—CERCLA, OPA, and the Clean
Water Act—make natural resource damages available for injuries from oil
and toxic releases.172 Under these statutes, federal, state, and tribal trustees
have authority to seek natural resource damages on behalf of the public.
Importantly, long-term natural resource injuries are among the
category of injuries that Congress intended to remedy. In particular, natural
resource damages are available for a broad suite of injuries including “a
measurable adverse change, either long- or short-term, in the chemical or
physical quality or the viability of a natural resource.”173 In addition, in a
170

See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 2d 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying commingled product theory liability in a case involving groundwater
contamination from gasoline additive); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying enterprise liability in a case involving an unidentifiable asbestos
manufacturer); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (applying market share liability in a
landmark products liability decision involving the DES drug).
171
See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51
(2008); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); Donald G. Gifford, The
Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613
(2005); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7 (2006).
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Some states also provide additional statutory schemes allowing recovery for natural resource
damages. The causation requirements associated with state statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.
Instead, this Article focuses on the major federal statutes that will be the most instrumental in
determining natural resource liabilities for oil spills.
173
43 C.F.R. § 11.14(v) (2013). Of particular note is the fact that damages are available for loss of
ecosystem function. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (2006). Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological,
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move that facilitates recovery for long-term injuries, Congress provided a
three-year statute of limitations that runs not from the date of incident but
from the date that the injuries are discovered.174
Notably, these statutes do not require any particular level of ecological
disruption to characterize a resource as injured. Injury is defined broadly
enough to include “an observable or measurable adverse change in a
natural resource.”175 The broad definition of injury means that assigning
liability for long-term natural resource injuries is at least theoretically
possible.
But what measure of causal proof does Congress deem sufficient to
support a claim for long-term injuries? The answer to that question is less
clear. At a minimum, some causal connection is required. CERCLA, for
instance, makes responsible parties liable for “damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs
of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release.”176 OPA similarly provides for natural resource damages that result
from a discharge of oil.177 Courts agree that this statutory language requires
trustees to show a causal link between injuries and the release.178
In Ohio v. Department of Interior, the D.C. Circuit considered whether
a natural resource damages claim required a showing of causation. That
case involved several challenges to the Department of Interior’s regulations
on natural resource damage assessment under CERCLA.179 One of the
challenges alleged that the level of proof required for establishing injury to
biological resources was too rigorous and inconsistent with Congress’s
intent to relax common law burdens of proof for causation. The court
recognized that Congress had liberalized causal standards of proof for cost
recovery and cleanup actions under CERCLA. Nonetheless, the court
refused to require federal agencies to adopt a similar scheme for natural
resource damage actions. In particular, the court concluded, “There is little
evidence, however, that Congress specifically intended to ease the standard
of proof for showing that a particular spill caused a particular biological
injury.”180 The court held that CERCLA is ambiguous as to whether causal
58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753 (2008) (making the case that lost ecosystem services can be redressed by
nuisance law but only in so far as the injury generates a traditional economic injury).
174
See CERCLA § 113(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1) (2006).
175
15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2013).
176
CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added).
177
See Oil Pollution Act § 1002(a), 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
178
See, e.g., Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that
CERCLA requires a causal link between the release and injury for purposes of establishing natural
resource damage claims); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986) (“(T]he use
in Section 107(f) of the word ‘resulted’ ties the damages to the releases. The proof must include a
causal link between releases and post-enactment damages which flowed therefrom.”).
179
880 F.2d at 438.
180
Id. at 470.
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burdens for natural resource damages claims ought to be relaxed in keeping
with the broader policy goals of CERCLA.181 In applying Chevron
deference to CERCLA’s ambiguities on the matter, the court upheld the
Department of Interior’s incorporation of traditional causation analysis in
its regulations.182
While Ohio v. Department of Interior clarifies the requirement that
trustees show a causal link between the release and the injury, it does not
resolve the question of the degree of proof required. Congress was silent on
the issue and so was the court. In fact, the court’s acknowledgment of
CERCLA’s ambiguity in Ohio v. Department of Interior leaves open the
possibility that a more relaxed causal standard would also have been
reasonable. In a later D.C. Circuit decision, Kennecott Utah Copper Corp.
v. Department of Interior,183 the court again acknowledged that there must
be a causal link between the alleged injury and the release, but noted,
“Congress has not specified precisely what that causal relationship should
be.”184 Congress appears to have left to the courts’ discretion the task of
choosing a causal test that is befitting to the challenges of proving longterm injuries.
Where might the causal test for long-term injuries come from? One
natural and obvious option is tort law. In fact, though natural resource
damages are provided by statute, several courts have appropriately
recognized that a natural resource damages action brought under
CERCLA185 “sounds basically in tort.”186 Tort law, in turn, supports a wide
range of causal standards, including the traditional but-for test and the more
relaxed contributing factor test.187
In determining whether a more lenient causation standard is
appropriate for natural resource damages, one might consider the larger
statutory frameworks that house natural resource damages. CERCLA in
particular is known for its radical departure from traditional liability
181

Id.
Id.
183
88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
184
Id. at 1224.
185
The similarity in the natural resource damage provisions provided in CERCLA, OPA, and the
Clean Water Act support a uniform approach to natural resource damages under any of these major
statutes. See Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (2006); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2006);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7) (2006).
186
United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 788 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(quoting In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F.
Supp. 994, 1000 (D. Mass. 1989)). But see Memphis Zane May Assocs. v. IBC Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp.
541, 546 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (“Traditional tort notions of causation do not apply in CERCLA, which
utilizes a ‘status-based’ liability standard.” (quoting Peter M. Manus, Natural Resource Damages from
Rachel Carson’s Perspective: A Rite of Spring in American Environmentalism, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 381, 417 (1996))).
187
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 36, §§ 41–44, at 263–319.
182
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schemes and for its imposition of strict joint and several liability for
cleanup costs based simply on categorical association with certain sites.188
For cost recovery actions,189 showing causation is not required at all.190 As
Professor John Copeland Nagle has explained, ordinarily “[c]ausation is a
necessary prerequisite for assigning responsibility in tort law, even in strict
liability regimes. Nonetheless, courts have excused the victims of
hazardous waste injuries from proving causation under CERCLA because
of the well-noted difficulties in determining the cause of injuries from
hazardous substances.”191
Very little separates the natural resource damages from other types of
liability created by CERCLA and OPA. In fact, some commentators have
noted that the only feature separating natural resource damages from cost
recovery actions is that trustees have to show an actual release to recover
natural resource damages, whereas recovery for cleanup costs requires only
a threatened release of oil or other toxins.192 These nearly identical legal
frameworks have led at least one commentator to argue for the same causal
standard to apply to natural resource damages as recovery actions—
namely, to jettison a causal requirement for natural resource damages
entirely.193 Though current statutory frameworks foreclose that option
absent legislative reform, the similarity between cost recovery and natural
resource damages claims might, at a minimum, suggest that the existing
188

4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES
ch. 8 (1992 & Supp. Winter 2012).
189
For a basic discussion of cost recovery actions, see Jason E. Panzer, Note, Apportioning
CERCLA Liability: Cost Recovery or Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 437, 443 (1996):
CERCLA authorizes two types of legal actions which allow parties to recover cleanup
expenses: cost recovery actions under § 107(a), which impose joint and several liability, and
contribution actions under § 113(f), which impose only several liability. The section under which
a plaintiff proceeds significantly affects parties’ rights concerning the scope of the defendant’s
liability, the plaintiff’s burden of proof, the applicable statute of limitations, and the availability of
defenses. Under the § 107 cost recovery action, a plaintiff may shift virtually all of its CERCLA
liability to the defendant with a relatively light burden of proof. In contrast, the § 113(f)
contribution action only permits plaintiffs to recover the defendant’s equitable share of the
response costs, and imposes a more stringent burden of proof.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
190
See RODGERS, supra note 188.
191
John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1493, 1496
(1994) (footnotes omitted); see also O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted) (“It has not gone unnoticed that holding defendants jointly and severally liable . . . may often
result in defendants paying for more than their share of the harm. Nevertheless, courts have continued
to impose joint and several liability . . . reasoning that where all of the contributing causes cannot fairly
be traced, Congress intended for those proven at least partially culpable to bear the cost of the
uncertainty.”).
192
See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 191, at 1514–16.
193
See James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation,
18 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217 (2000).
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statutes leave room for a more relaxed causation requirement for natural
resource damages.
C. Room Within the Existing Jurisprudence
In an area replete with complicated causal pathways and multiple
forces combining to create harm, courts have struggled in the face of very
little congressional guidance to develop a single standard for proving
causation for natural resource damages. Not many courts have considered
the issue.194 Those that have differ in their conclusions and are relatively
narrow in their approaches. All suffer from the confusion that inevitably
arises when the substantial factor test from traditional tort law is adopted or
rejected without clarification of its meaning. Indeed, further examination
reveals that their approaches are not as different as they might otherwise
appear. Moreover, their approaches might differ because some are more
careful than others to distinguish between cost recovery and natural
resource damages actions under CERCLA.195
One court has declined to formally adopt a new, special causation
standard for natural resource damages claims under CERCLA. In United
States v. Montrose Chemical Corp. of California, the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California announced in an unpublished order
that a “sole or substantially contributing” factor test applies to determining
causation for natural resource damages claims.196 The issue arose in the
context of a motion to dismiss and the court’s conclusion was not
supported by citations or any analysis. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the
trustee’s complaint as insufficiently pled because the trustee had not
alleged, for each defendant, that specific releases were the “sole or
substantially contributing” cause of specific natural resource injuries.197
194

Only three courts have decided the issue, with varying levels of analysis. See Coeur D’Alene
Tribe v. Asarco Inc., No. CV91-0342NEJL, CV96-0122NEJL, 2001 WL 34139603, at *4 (D. Idaho
Mar. 30, 2001) (rejecting the substantial factor test as too restrictive and adopting the more relaxed
contributing factor test); United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., No. CV 90-3122 AAH (JRX),
1991 WL 183147, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1991) (adopting substantial factor test with no analysis); In
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 722 F. Supp. 893,
897 (D. Mass. 1989) (rejecting substantial factor test as too restrictive and adopting more relaxed
contributing factor test).
195
There are three major causes of action under CERCLA: cost recovery claims (imposes joint and
several liability for cleanup expenses); contribution claims (imposes several liability and allows parties
that have been sued to seek indemnity from other potentially responsible parties); and natural resource
damages claims (allows specially designated government trustees to seek damages that will be used for
restoration). See CERCLA §§ 107(a), 113(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f). “The section under which
a plaintiff proceeds significantly affects parties’ rights concerning the scope of the defendant’s liability,
the plaintiff’s burden of proof, the applicable statute of limitations, and the availability of defenses.”
Panzer, supra note 189. Because of these various causes of action, courts and litigants have to be
cautious about treating cases from one context as controlling for another.
196
Montrose, 1991 WL 183147, at *1.
197
Id.
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The Montrose court did not expressly discuss the bounds of its test. It
did not specify what a plaintiff must show in order to satisfy this standard.
Must the release be a substantial contributing cause when standing alone,
as the classic version of the substantial factor test would require? How
significant must the contribution be to rise to the level of “substantial”?
Since the Montrose case comes out of the Central District of California,
and since the California Supreme Court has permitted even very minor
forces to be considered “substantial factor[s],”198 perhaps the Montrose
court intended to create a lenient version of the substantial factor test. In
that case, we might consider whether the Montrose decision is really all
that different from the other two courts that have considered the issue.
In contrast to the Montrose court, two other district courts have
rejected the substantial factor test as too restrictive for natural resource
damages claims. Instead, they have adopted a more relaxed contributing
factor test. The first district court to adopt a relaxed causal test was the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts. In Acushnet River, a
CERCLA case involving the PCB contamination of the Acushnet River and
New Bedford Harbor, the court considered whether the defendants would
be held liable for natural resource damages arising from a mixture of PCB
releases—some of which were federally permitted and some of which were
not.199 The court rejected the substantial factor test and concluded that the
trustees need only show that the nonfederally permitted releases were a
“contributing factor to an injury.”200
Even though the court in Acushnet River ultimately adopted a
contributing factor test, it did so somewhat reluctantly. The court in
Acushnet River acknowledged that the first draft of its opinion would have
required proof that the nonfederally permitted releases were a “substantial”
factor in bringing about the injury. In a footnote, the court explained that it
adopted the more relaxed test because of an intervening decision from the
First Circuit, O’Neil v. Picillo.201 The court did not explain, however, why it
believed the First Circuit’s opinion was controlling. The First Circuit
opinion did reject substantiality as a basis for determining joint and several
liability under CERCLA, but the case dealt with a recovery action and was
not necessarily controlling on the issue of causal standards for natural
resource damages.202 Nonetheless, whether out of confusion or a deliberate
attempt to reconcile the various remedies available under CERCLA, the
district court in Acushnet River backed away from its initial impulse to
impose the more traditional substantial factor test. Like the Montrose court,
the court in Acushnet River did not discuss what evidence a plaintiff would
198
199
200
201
202

See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 404 (Cal. 1999).
In re Acushnet River, 722 F. Supp. at 895–97.
Id. at 897 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 897 n.8 (citing O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989)).
See O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 178, 179 n.4.
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have to show to meet the test adopted by the court. This makes it more
difficult to know what the court believed was the difference between
“substantial factor” and “contributing factor.”
By the same token, the court in Acushnet River also did not offer an
explanation as to what showing is necessary to satisfy the contributing
factor test. In a footnote, the court offered only the slightest justification by
acknowledging that defendants responsible only for de minimis
contributions to harm should not be held liable.203 The court only cited two
sources that discuss the de minimis exception in the context of the
substantial factor test,204 and none that discuss it within the contributing
factor test. The court offered no standard for what de minimis means in the
more relaxed contributing factor test.
The most thorough examination of the proper causal test for natural
resource damages came from the U.S. District Court for the District of
Idaho in Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco.205 In that case, federal and tribal
trustees filed a natural resource damages claim for injuries caused by mine
tailings206 in northern Idaho.207 In response to the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the court was asked to consider whether the trustees
had established the requisite level of causation to prove natural resource
damages.208 The court began its analysis with CERCLA’s statutory
language and in particular the phrase “resulting from.”209 Interestingly, the
court found the statutory language ambiguous even on the issue of whether
Congress meant to create a stricter causation standard for natural resource
damages claims than for response cost actions.210
On balance, and in keeping with other courts that have considered the
threshold issue, the court concluded that CERCLA imposes a causation
requirement for natural resource damages claims.211 The court’s reading of
the statute as ambiguous, however, likely played a role in the court’s
decision to adopt a lenient standard of causation. In particular, the court
203

Acushnet River, 722 F. Supp. at 897 n.11.
Id. (citing Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 440 A.2d 455, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981), aff’d as modified, 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965)).
205
No. CV91-0342NEJL, CV96-0122NEJL, 2001 WL 34139603 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2001).
206
Mine tailings are waste byproducts generated when metals are extracted from large quantities of
rock during mining operations. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL REPORT: DESIGN AND
EVALUATION OF TAILINGS DAMS 1 (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/
special/mining/techdocs/tailings.pdf.
207
2001 WL 34139603, at *1.
208
Id. at *2.
209
Id. at *3.
210
Id. at *4. Recall that the D.C. Circuit in Ohio v. Department of Interior had previously held that
some proof of causation was required by CERCLA in the natural resource damage context, even though
the statute was ambiguous as to what the particular standard should be. See supra notes 179–82 and
accompanying text.
211
Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 2001 WL 34139603, at *5.
204
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explained that traditional notions of causation do not apply in response cost
actions. When there are problems of multiple polluters and commingled
waste, imposing quantitative thresholds or requiring the trustee to trace
releases to each responsible party is “too restrictive.”212
Applying the rationale associated with response cost cases, the court
found that the “causation standard for [natural resource damage] actions is
also less restrictive than traditional federal common law.”213 The court
concluded that where releases have been commingled, trustees have only
the burden of proving that a release of commingled hazardous substances is
a contributing factor to the harm.214 To be a contributing factor, the release
must have been more than a de minimis amount, and “at least some of the
injury would have occurred if only the Defendant’s amount of release had
occurred.”215
Throughout its opinion, the court was careful to distinguish between
recovery actions and actions for natural resource damages. The court’s
adoption of the recovery action rationale in the natural resource damages
context is not a function of confusion; it is a deliberate recognition that
similar causation standards ought to be applied to factual situations that
pose similar problems of proof.
The court’s justification for a less stringent causation standard comes
from the problems associated with commingled waste. After articulating
the relaxed standard for commingled releases, the court went on to say, “In
cases where releases have not been commingled, the burden would be to
show that such release was the sole or proximate cause to the injury to the
natural resources.”216 The court, therefore, distinguished commingled
releases from noncommingled releases. This distinction does not emerge
from any deeper examination of whether the causal problems in natural
resource damages claims actually turn on the characterization of releases as
commingled. If taken literally, the court’s distinction between commingled
and noncommingled waste creates some problems for the recovery of longterm injuries after oil spills or other such singular releases.217
212

Id.
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Oil spills are typically singular releases, not commingled. Nonetheless, oil spills pose causal
dilemmas similar to the kind of commingled hazardous substance release at issue in Asarco and
therefore warrant similar treatment. In both cases, there are many contributing forces that complicate
the causal question. For long-term injuries from singular releases like oil spills, there can be multiple
sources of toxins negatively impacting the ecosystem in combination, though the relative contribution
of each might be unknown. See Conceptual Model, supra note 10, at 672, 690–712 (describing the
multiple natural and anthropogenic stressors that affect ecosystem function of Prince William Sound
after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill). Similarly, for commingled waste releases, there are multiple
contributors to harm, though the relative weight of each is unknown. See Nagle, supra note 191, at 1500
213
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To summarize the paucity of jurisprudence, three district courts have
considered what causal standard should be applied to natural resource
damages actions under CERCLA—one used substantial factor, one would
have applied substantial factor but for its belief that a First Circuit decision
in a recovery action case was controlling (likely a point of confusion), and
one would apply a relaxed contributing factor test, but only where there is
commingled waste. No courts have expressly considered the issue under
OPA. No courts have considered the unique burdens of proving long-term
natural resource injuries.
D. Room Within Broader Tort Goals of
Corrective Justice and Deterrence
It is one thing to say that statutes and court decisions leave room for an
alternate causal paradigm for proving long-term natural resource injuries. It
is another thing to adopt a relaxed causal standard when doing so leaves
responsible parties exposed to greater liability for injuries that are
admittedly further removed in time from the original spill, and thus more
difficult to prove with great certainty. Before offering up alternate
paradigms that would facilitate the recovery of long-term damages, it is
worth pausing to consider whether doing so would be consistent with
underlying principles of tort law.
One small caveat is in order. Though there is a rich torts literature and
passionate scholarly debate over which goal—corrective justice or
deterrence—lies at the heart of tort, stepping into that debate is not the aim
of this Article.218 The aim here is much more modest; it simply asks
whether a relaxed form of causation for long-term natural resource injuries
is justified under either a corrective justice or deterrence theory of tort. The
character of ecological injuries and the inherent risks associated with oil
transport and drilling suggest that a relaxed causal paradigm for natural

(describing causation difficulties under CERCLA); infra note 248 (assembling cases discussing the
complex nature of Superfund releases). In each case, there are commingled stressors—whether arising
from commingled waste or the uncertain combination of multiple forces working together through
unknown mechanisms to wreak environmental havoc. In either case, the difficulty of quantifying
relative contributions of harm necessitates a causal standard that alleviates the need to weigh the
relative contribution of harm from multiple actors or multiple forces. See Nagle, supra note 191. The
distinction between multiple polluters and multiple forces, each of which combine to cause harm, may
be a distinction without a difference when it comes to the adoption of the contributing factor test. All of
this is to say that when the Asarco court suggested that a relaxed causation standard was not appropriate
in the case of noncommingled releases, the court most likely did not have the case of oil spills or longterm injuries in mind.
218
For a thorough examination of the scholarly literature and debate, see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802–
11 (1997).
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resource damages would concurrently serve the corrective justice and
deterrence rationales.219
Under the theory of corrective justice, tort liability is rationalized by
the moral responsibility that the tortious actor has to the injured party.220
Corrective justice is an extension of early rationalizations of tort liability in
terms of “fairness” or “moral sense of community.”221
Viewing the issue from a corrective justice standpoint, relaxing the
causal paradigm for long-term natural resource injuries makes good sense
for two reasons. The first is the inability of a traditional paradigm to
provide full compensation.222 Retaining a causal paradigm that
demonstrably absolves tortious actors from liability for long-term injuries
contradicts the corrective justice goal of tort law. Similar observations have
been made in the toxic torts context. For example, to avoid systematically
undercompensating victims of difficult-to-prove latent injuries, Professor
Margaret Berger suggests the causal element be eliminated entirely for
certain toxic tort cases.223 Doing so, she argues, is necessary to serve the
needs of corrective justice. Otherwise, “[c]ausation knocks out the link
between culpability and liability.”224 While the statutory language of
CERCLA and OPA does not permit elimination of the causal element for
natural resource damages,225 Professor Berger’s underlying observations
apply equally well to the factually similar context of long-term natural
resource damages.
The public nature of injuries arguably places greater moral
responsibility on the tortious actor to fully restore the health of collectively
owned resources. To that end, a unique and defining feature of natural
resource damages claims are their roots in the public trust doctrine and
their purpose of ensuring that the public is adequately compensated for
losses to collectively owned natural resources.226 Also, unlike in toxic torts
219

Id. at 1821 (arguing that the American rule of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
is justified on both corrective justice and deterrence grounds).
220
See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972)
(examining corrective justice rationale).
221
See Schwartz, supra note 218, at 1802 & n.3 (citing James Barr Ames, Law and Morals,
22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 101, 109 (1908), as an example of how early justifications of tort law appealed to
a sense of fairness).
222
See discussion supra Part I.C.
223
See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2131–34 (1997).
224
Id. at 2134.
225
See discussion infra Part II.B.
226
See Manus, supra note 186, at 433–38. For an argument of why greater responsibilities attach to
public trust resources, see James M. Olson, Shifting the Burden of Proof: How the Common Law Can
Safeguard Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic, 20 ENVTL. L. 891, 906–07 (1990) (“With the
recognition that certain global commons—the . . . seas, sea beds . . . —are critical to the sustainability
of earth and are impressed with a public trust, those who seek to alter, reallocate, or dispose of such
commons directly—or indirectly through pollution—have the burden of proving that their proposed
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cases where plaintiffs seek compensation for private injuries, natural
resource damages must be used to restore the injured ecosystems. Because
recovered damages are earmarked for the public benefit, a more aggressive
tort liability scheme (with more relaxed causal requirements) does not carry
the risk of providing a windfall to a single individual. Rather, to the extent
that a relaxed causal paradigm carries a risk of overcompensation, any
resulting windfall returns to the public sphere. Such windfalls might even
be characterized as a Pigovian tax227 on engaging in activities that can result
in catastrophic harm.
Tort law has long found liability for activities with a high risk of
public harm. For example, the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine
imposes strict liability on actors that introduce unusual dangers into the
community.228 Before imposing strict liability under this doctrine, courts
consider, among other factors, the likelihood that any resulting harm will
be great, the existence of a high degree of risk to the land of others, and the
inability to eliminate the risk through exercise of reasonable care.229 These
factors could be applied to oil transport or drilling. Consider that the New
Jersey Supreme Court has applied this doctrine to hold a “landowner . . .
strictly liable to others for harm caused by toxic wastes . . . stored on his
property and flow[ing] onto the property of others.”230
Of course, the idea here is not to argue for a strict liability regime for
oil spills, but rather to illustrate that tort law has seen fit to relax liability
schemes for activities that by their very nature pose great risk to the public.
Under similar logic, it would seem that tort law could amply support a
relaxed causal standard as consistent with its underlying goals of fairness
and deterrence. In fact, a tort system focused on corrective justice would

conduct would not impair the functional or sustainable level of these natural systems or their values.
The public trust, by shifting the burden of proof, thus brings an ethical dimension within the reach of
the legal system.”).
227
A Pigovian tax (also spelled Pigouvian) is a “tax levied on an agent causing an environmental
externality (environmental damage) as an incentive to avert or mitigate such damage.” Pigouvian Tax
Definition, GLOSSARY OF STAT. TERMS, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2065 (last updated
Nov. 20, 2001). Several scholars have discussed how the Pigovian tax could guide environmental and
energy policy. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
303, 396 (2004) (suggesting greater use of Pigouvian taxes “to make environmental law take greater
account of efficiency-oriented approaches”); Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an
Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1
(2010) (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of a petroleum fuel price stabilization plan to a
Pigouvian tax); see also Robert H. Frank, Heads, You Win. Tails, You Win, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2013, at BU6 (explaining the economic, social, and individual benefits of Pigovian taxes).
228
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, at 36 (1977).
229
Id.
230
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983).
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reject the prospect of a private tortfeasor reaping profit from an activity that
leaves the public to absorb the cost of long-term harm.231
There is at least one countervailing consideration. Though oil transport
and drilling might well be high-risk activities, these activities are not
without public benefit. Some might argue that the public and industrial
society demand the existence of oil companies and their engagement in oil
transport and drilling, despite the known risks. Given the public service
provided by oil transport and drilling, some might argue that imposing
harsher standards of liability simply shifts the responsibility of an oildependent nation from society writ large onto the few companies that have
taken on the task of providing a desired service.
Courts would likely reject the idea that the public demand for oil
might justify less rigorous forms of liability. Such a social utility analysis,
if litigants were inclined to suggest one, might be derived from the
unavoidably unsafe products doctrine. That doctrine has been invoked most
prominently in cases where products liability actions are made against
manufacturers of vaccines.232 In those cases, the societal goal of
maintaining an adequate supply of vaccines outweighs the risks inherent in
the products, and courts have limited tort liability.233 In other areas where
defendants have made similar social utility arguments, however, courts
have rejected them. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected an
electric utility’s argument that the benefits of providing electricity for the
community outweighed the harm suffered by a plaintiff: “We know of no
acceptable rule of jurisprudence that permits those who are engaged in
important and desirable enterprises to injure with impunity those who are
engaged in enterprises of lesser economic significance.”234
It is not simply tort’s corrective justice goal that would be served by a
causal paradigm more befitting the difficulties of proving long-term natural
231

See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (“[A]s between an innocent plaintiff
and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury.”); see also Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (en banc) (“The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.”).
232
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (discussing the unavoidably
unsafe products doctrine and its application to vaccines); see also Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp.
1483, 1496 (D. Kan. 1987) (discussing the limits of the unavoidably unsafe products doctrine but
explaining that “[c]omment k recognizes that some products, such as certain drugs, are so beneficial and
necessary that the manufacturer of these products should not, in all instances, be held strictly liable for
unforeseeable harm”).
233
See, e.g., Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 524 (N.J. 1989).
234
Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Wis. 1969) (discussed in ROBIN KUNDIS
CRAIG ET AL., TOXIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 80–81 (2011) [hereinafter
TOXIC TORTS]). In Jost, sulfur dioxide gas emitted from the plant settled onto farm fields and caused
damage and loss of market value to the crops. Id. at 649. Jost and the other farmers brought suit in
nuisance against Dairyland for the damage caused. Id.
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resource damages. A relaxed causal standard for natural resource damages
also serves the deterrence goal of tort law. That goal is worth pursuing for
two reasons. First, the injuries resulting from an oil spill are catastrophic
and hard, if not impossible, to undo.235 There is no doubt that every oil spill
leaves a permanent stain on the environment, so there is an even greater
need to deter oil spills from occurring in the first place.
Second, many oil spills are avoidable. Consider the type of corporate
behavior that resulted in the BP Gulf Oil Spill and the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill. The Exxon spill was the result of a corporate culture that had become
complacent with alcoholism and desensitized to the risk of oil transport.236
Similarly, the BP spill was the result of a pattern of reckless decisions
regarding the maintenance and safety of oil rigs.237 The avoidability of the
Exxon and BP oil spills suggest that deterrence still has a role to play.
One way to encourage corporations to attend to safety is through
legislation, in the way that Congress passed OPA in 1990 after the Exxon
spill. Another way is to demand more complete liability and adopt a causal
paradigm that holds tortfeasors liable for the full suite of ecological
injuries. The risk of more substantial damages would motivate corporations
engaged in oil transport and drilling to adhere more strictly and consistently
to safety protocols. In some ways, this is simply an argument for assigning
liability to the cheapest cost avoider, which is the party in the best position
to identify risks and adopt modifications in behavior.238
The idea that tort law would support assigning liability to the cheapest
cost avoider is not new.239 Judge Guido Calabresi has long since and aptly
remarked that the deterrence goals in tort law are to be achieved “by
creating incentives so that people will avoid those future injuries worth
avoiding and thus achieve an optimal trade-off between safety and injury in
a world where safety is not a free good, and hence injury is not a total

235

For a discussion of ecological injuries following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, see supra Part I.A.
See Brief of Experts on Alcohol in the Workplace as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (No. 07-219), 2008 WL 275485.
237
DEEP WATER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at vii (“The explosive loss of the Macondo
well could have been prevented.”).
238
Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 666 (1975) [hereinafter
Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence]; see also Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 35, at 84
(identifying the attributes of the cheapest cost avoider).
239
See supra note 238; see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (“It requires of such an institution only a decision as
to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between
accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made.”); Stephen G.
Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1301–03
(1992) (“[I]n modern American tort law[,] . . . many negligence cases may in practice be litigated by
reference to the cheapest cost-avoider test . . . . [T]he cheapest cost-avoider criterion played a central
part in determining the meaning of strict liability and the meaning of negligence throughout the long
evolution of English tort law . . . .”).
236
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bad.”240 Calabresi suggests that choosing an appropriate causation paradigm
can help achieve that optimal allocation.241 In particular, the key is allowing
flexibility in the causation inquiry.242 Causal concepts, Calabresi explains,
are simply tools for assigning fault in accord with social goals.243 The rigid
application of causal concepts, therefore, “would no longer adequately
serve the goals we can analyze nor would they permit the introduction of
goals we cannot affirm too openly or have not been able to analyze at
all.”244
III. IDENTIFYING THE CORE CAUSAL CHALLENGES
Having identified the need for a new causal paradigm to remedy longterm ecological injuries, and having concluded that space for an alternate
paradigm exists, the logical next question is what such a paradigm might
look like. Indeed, given that tort law has a history of grappling with
difficult questions of causation, the real question is whether tools already
exist that could adequately address the causal problems raised by long-term
ecological injuries. Where is the flexibility of tort law needed? In other
words, what are the core causal challenges that lie at the heart of long-term
ecological injuries?
One way of uncovering the core challenges might be to consider what
they are not. For instance, in the area of toxic torts, an area raising similar
problems of latent, long-term injuries, courts have fashioned numerous
innovative approaches to causation. Many of these innovations address
problems of the indeterminate defendant.245 While those cases involve
injuries traceable to a particular type of product (e.g., asbestos), difficult
questions of causation arise because the plaintiff cannot identify which of
the many defendant product manufacturers caused the harm.246 To deal with
240

Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 35, at 77.
Id. at 81 (“The requirement of proximity in causal relationships, unlike that of but for
relationships, may help to select from the universe of causally linked actions those actions worth
deterring collectively.”); id. at 85 (suggesting that “[o]ne could do away with the but for test” if one
employed other methods for identifying the cheapest cost avoider); id. at 88 (“Past foreseeability is not,
however, a prerequisite to liability if the object is market deterrence.”).
242
Id. at 107.
243
Id. at 106.
244
Id. at 107.
245
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 92, § 189, at 633 & n.10 (listing examples of many different tort
doctrines that might be relevant in a multiple polluter situation).
246
Classic burden-shifting cases like Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (en banc), are
likewise founded on the notion that all relevant defendants are before the court. In Summers, for
instance, there were only two possible defendants, both of those defendants were before the court, both
defendants acted negligently, and one of those defendants actually caused the injury. See 199 P.2d at 1–
2. However, in situations where the cause of an injury is not fully known and where there are multiple
potential defendants, not all of whom are parties to the case, courts are more reluctant to impose joint
and several liability under Summers. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal. 1980)
(rejecting the application of Summers to the toxic tort context where there were over 200 potential
241
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this problem, some courts have applied a theory of “enterprise liability,”
whereby all manufacturers of a given product are held jointly liable if they
adhered to industry-wide safety standards that created an unreasonable risk
of harm.247
Similar to the indeterminate defendant problem, many CERCLA cases
grapple with the difficulties of apportioning harm among multiple
polluters. Typically, those cases involve the release of a hazardous
substance that is a mixture of substances from many generators leaking
from hundreds of barrels or more.248 Given the length of time over which
releases occurred and the number of parties that have contributed over time
to the pool of toxic waste, separating whose waste caused what harm is
nearly impossible.249 In fact, the causal difficulties that arise in that
situation are well-known drivers in Congress’s decision to jettison a
traditional causation requirement in CERCLA cost recovery actions.250 In
those actions, the government only needs to show that there was a release
from the site, but it need not show which potentially responsible party’s
substance caused the actual harm.251
One key feature of multiple polluter cases is that a group of potentially
responsible parties is typically identified by their relation to the site where
the release took place. While delineating the particular harm attributable to
defendants, not all of whom were joined in the litigation); see also Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941
P.2d 1203, 1216 (Cal. 1997) (noting that “the majority of courts have refused to extend the doctrine of
alternative liability and its burden-shifting” to cases where the court is uncertain whether the culpable
party is before the court).
247
See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Generally,
this theory is reserved for industries comprised of a relatively small number of manufacturers complicit
in unacceptable testing, warning, and efficacy standards for their common product. Id.
248
See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that “most
CERCLA cost-recovery actions involve numerous, commingled hazardous substances with synergistic
effects and unknown toxicity”). The leading case on imposing joint and several liability under
CERCLA, U.S. v. Chem-Dyne Corp., described the nature of its fairly complex factual determination
like this:
The Chem-Dyne facility contains a variety of hazardous waste from 289 generators or
transporters, consisting of about 608,000 pounds of material. Some of the wastes have
commingled but the identities of the sources of these wastes remain unascertained. The fact of the
mixing of the wastes raises an issue as to the divisibility of the harm. Further, a dispute exists over
which of the wastes have contaminated the ground water, the degree of their migration and
concomitant health hazard.
572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
249
Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d at 897–99 (surveying CERCLA jurisprudence on joint and several
liability and describing multiple cases in which courts found it difficult to apportion liability from
multiple, commingled sources); see also O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[W]here
wastes of varying (and unknown) degrees of toxicity and migratory potential commingle, it simply is
impossible to determine the amount of environmental harm caused by each party.”).
250
Nagle, supra note 191 (footnote omitted) (“[C]ourts have excused the victims of hazardous
waste injuries from proving causation under CERCLA because of the well-noted difficulties in
determining the cause of injuries from hazardous substances.”).
251
Id. at 1511.
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each might be a difficult proposition, confidence is relatively high that the
harm is caused by the collective actions of the group.252 Often, therefore,
the potentially responsible parties are held jointly and severally liable.253
By contrast to the indeterminate defendant cases in toxic tort or
CERCLA’s multiple polluter cases, oil spills are generally one-time
releases from a single tortfeasor or vessel. Incidents like the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill or the BP Gulf Oil Spill are readily identifiable in terms of the
substance released, the parties responsible for that release, and the timing
of the release. In the oil spill context, therefore, the causation dilemma goes
beyond apportioning liability among members of an identifiable group.
Unlike problems of apportioning harm among multiple defendants, the
most nettlesome problem characterizing long-term harms from oil spills is
the differentiation of harm from background stressors and the oil exposure
itself. Oceans are particularly challenging in this regard. Several scholars
and international organizations have noted that the background degraded
state of the oceans is a substantial issue.254 For example, the United Nations
Environment Program has assembled a laundry list of background stressors
that threaten ocean ecosystems, including pollution from “land-based
sources, oil spills, untreated sewage, heavy siltation, eutrophication
(nutrient enrichment), invasive species, persistent organic pollutants
(POPs), . . . acidification, radioactive substances, marine litter, overfishing
and destruction of coastal and marine habitats.”255
Climate change is adding to and compounding these existing
background stressors.256 A 2011 workshop led by the International
Programme on the State of the Ocean and the International Union for
Conservation of Nature concluded that “[r]esilience of the ocean to climate
change impacts is severely compromised by the other stressors from human
activities” and that “[e]cosystem collapse is occurring as a result of both
current and emerging stressors.”257
As Professor Robin Kundis Craig has explained, these background
stressors are even more problematic when synergistic interactions are
252

See Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810.
See id.; Nagle, supra note 191, at 1519–20.
254
See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Avoiding Jellyfish Seas, or, What Do We Mean by “Sustainable
Oceans,” Anyway?, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 17 (2011) [hereinafter Avoiding Jellyfish Seas].
255
See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME & GRID-ARENDAL, OUR PRECIOUS COASTS:
MARINE POLLUTION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE RESILIENCE OF COASTAL ECOSYSTEMS 15 (Christian
Nellemann & Emily Corcoran eds., 2006), available at http://www.grida.no/files/publications/ourprecious-coasts_lr.pdf.
256
See Avoiding Jellyfish Seas, supra note 254, at 30; Robin Kundis Craig, Ocean Governance for
the 21st Century: Making Marine Zoning Climate Change Adaptable, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 305,
315–23 (2012) [hereinafter Ocean Governance for the 21st Century].
257
A.D. ROGERS & D.D’A. LAFFOLEY, INTERNATIONAL EARTH SYSTEM EXPERT WORKSHOP ON
OCEAN STRESSES AND IMPACTS: SUMMARY REPORT 6 (2011), available at http://www.stateoftheocean.
org/pdfs/1906_IPSO-LONG.pdf.
253
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considered.258 In particular, Professor Craig warns that “[o]verfishing is
generally considered the primary threat to marine biodiversity, especially
when fishing methods also destroy habitat . . . . Overfishing can also
interact synergistically with other stresses, such as marine pollution, to
destroy the productivity of a particular marine area.”259 In more general
terms, Professor Robert Rabin has described the problems of collective and
synergistic harms for environmental torts:
[E]nvironmental torts evoke an entirely different perspective on liability, one
which is virtually unknown at common law. Frequently, environmental harm
is a consequence of the aggregate risk created by a considerable number of
independently acting enterprises. . . . Or, it may be that the risk inherent in the
product is substantial, but it soon merges into a common pool. Whatever the
case, environmental harm is very often collective harm.260

Few tort doctrines grapple expressly with situations where man-made
and natural or background forces combine to create a single, indivisible
injury. A notable exception is the twin fires case that was an early adopter
of the substantial factor analysis.261 In that case, two fires combined to burn
down the plaintiff’s property; one fire was from an unknown origin and
could not therefore be traced to a tortious actor. Nonetheless, the court
applied the substantial factor test and concluded that the defendant could be
held liable even where another force—whether natural or unnatural—might
also have independently caused the harm. There is one caveat, however.
Each cause has to be sufficient on its own to cause the harm.262 This caveat
poses no problem to the twin fires scenario but the same might not be true
in some natural resource damages settings where there are multiple
contributing causes, whose collective stress gives rise to harm even though
no one individual stressor would be sufficient. In that way the twin fires
formulation of the substantial factor test fails to recognize harm from
synergistic causes.
This is not to say that tort law, or the substantial factor test, is
incapable of addressing synergistic harms. California courts, for instance,
have adopted a broad version of the substantial factor test that would hold
defendants liable so long as “the contribution of the individual cause [is]
more than negligible or theoretical.”263 In addition, the idea of synergistic
harms has been identified in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. In particular,
comment f observes that the substantial factor test would be appropriate in
258

See Avoiding Jellyfish Seas, supra note 254, at 26.
Id.
260
Rabin, supra note 151, at 32.
261
See supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
262
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 92, § 189, at 632.
263
Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997); see also Bockrath v. Aldrich
Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 404 (Cal. 1999) (emphasizing the broad nature of the substantial factor test
by clarifying that “a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor”).
259
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situations where the tortious conduct combines with other forces to create
harm (even if it does not create harm on its own):
In some cases, tortious conduct by one actor is insufficient, even with other
background causes, to cause the plaintiff’s harm. Nevertheless, when
combined with conduct by other persons, the conduct overdetermines the
harm, i.e., is more than sufficient to cause the harm. . . . The fact that an
actor’s conduct requires other conduct to be sufficient to cause another’s harm
does not obviate the applicability of this Section.264

In this way, the Restatement Third seems to support the use of the
substantial factor test (or some version thereof) in cases where exposure to
oil combined with other environmental stressors (including background
stressors) to create harm. Similarly, the Restatement would seem to
recognize the imposition of liability where synergistic effects of an oil spill
give rise to harm.
Conceptually, comment f comes closest to appropriately capturing the
multiple interacting forces that potentially combine to create harm when
toxic stressors are added to sensitive marine ecosystems. To the extent that
this approach most accurately describes the problems faced by trustees in
the natural resource damages context, it provides a useful starting point for
thinking about how to apply doctrines like the contributing factor test to
injuries manifesting in the long-term wake of oil spills.
This might be a good place to pause for a moment and consider why
tortfeasors should be prepared to shoulder the costs of long-term harms,
especially if they arise only in combination with other forces of nature.
Why should Exxon or BP be held liable for long-term injuries when those
injuries will necessarily be a partial function of environmental factors
beyond their control? The Gulf of Mexico, for instance, was not exactly a
poster child for pristine ecosystems before the BP Gulf Oil Spill.265 And the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill is certainly not solely responsible for the inevitable
extinction of the AT-1 pod of killer whales in Prince William Sound.266 In
each of these examples, the tortfeasor might contribute only relatively
small stressors, but in the already fragile state of an overstressed
ecosystem, these could lead to more catastrophic long-term impacts than
would otherwise have been predicted. In the case of the killer whale pods,
the harm may be the acceleration of an adverse but probable event.
One reason tortfeasors should shoulder the burden of synergistic
harms might come from a basic principle of tort: nature is like a classic
eggshell plaintiff.267 Parties such as Exxon or BP, who are engaged in risky
264

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
cmt. f, at 380 (2010).
265
Craig, A Match Made in Hell, supra note 12, at 1890.
266
See supra note 84.
267
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 92, § 206, at 711–13 (explaining the eggshell plaintiff rule and its role
in the proximate cause inquiry).
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behavior with potentially catastrophic environmental consequences, take
the plaintiff as they find it. Nature comes in complicated forms with
varying levels of susceptibility to injury, depending on the other stressors
acting upon the particular ecosystem at issue. Complications like climate
change and natural variability are simply part of the backdrop. Indeed,
enough evidence that climate change is happening has emerged that it can
fairly be considered the new vulnerable and uncertain state in which nature
exists. When viewed as simply part of the eggshell plaintiff that is nature
herself, climate change, like a preexisting condition, cannot fairly serve as
a counterexplanation for long-term harm. Given that enough scientific
literature has now been assembled to make long-term injuries more
foreseeable, the eggshell plaintiff rule is even more apt—that long-term
injuries will be sustained is foreseeable even if the amount or particular
type of the harm is still unknown.268
An alternative approach would be apportionment—that is,
apportioning harm between background stressors and the oil spill
defendant. Apportionment, a concept that has been both suggested269 and
criticized270 in the toxic tort context, would hold defendants liable for only
the portion of the harm that was attributable to the oil spill. The appeal of
such an approach is fairness to the defendant, and for that reason, it is
worth considering.271 The practical infeasibility of apportionment, however,
demands a different solution.
In the CERCLA cost recovery context, where there are multiple
polluters who have contributed or potentially contributed hazardous
substances to a site of release, courts have rejected apportionment as too

268

Id. (describing the rule as one that imposes liability for foreseeable harms even when the
amount of harm is not foreseeable).
269
See, e.g., Dafler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 611 A.2d 136, 146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992),
aff’d, 622 A.2d 1305 (N.J. 1993) (affirming apportionment between smoking and asbestos); Gerald W.
Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Contribution Model, 25 ENVTL. L. 549, 549
(1995) (suggesting for “toxic tort cases involving multiple sources of toxic-related risks . . . a risk
contribution model that compares the toxic-related risks each entity created that contributed to the
resultant harm”).
270
See Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 948 (Pa. 1987) (reversing
instruction allowing apportionment between smoking and asbestos); Richard W. Wright, Allocating
Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for
Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (1988) (criticizing the abandonment of
joint and several liability); see also Robert M. Guo, Reasonable Bases for Apportioning Harm Under
CERCLA, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317, 319–20 (2010) (“Making apportionment easier to justify, and thereby
making recovery of cleanup costs harder to obtain, contravenes CERCLA’s objective of placing the cost
of cleanup on persons whose activities contributed to the contamination.”).
271
See Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349
(1992); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 439 (1990).
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complicated and burdensome on the plaintiff.272 Rather, Congress has
accepted a polluter-pays approach that assigns liability and then leaves
potentially responsible parties to sort out apportionment among
themselves.273
Similar complications would arise if courts attempted to apportion
harm for long-term ecological harms. In fact, it would conceivably be even
more difficult to apportion harm between a defendant and an unquantifiable
mixture of diffuse environmental stressors that together depress the healthy
functioning of an ecosystem.274 Imagine, for a moment, how one would
divide liability among the impacts of overfishing, climate change, and
runoff pollution on a marine ecosystem. First, one would have to quantify
the degree to which each of the stressors impacted the marine ecosystem
and by which biological pathways.275 After all, the relevance of each
stressor’s contribution to the harm will depend on the type of harm at issue.
Second, one would have to know how each of the stressors interacted with
the others so that synergistic potential could be accounted for.276 These

272

See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that “where wastes of
varying (and unknown) degrees of toxicity and migratory potential commingle, it simply is impossible
to determine the amount of environmental harm caused by each party”).
273
Nagle, supra note 191, at 1493, 1509 (explaining that CERCLA is a “polluters pay” liability
scheme that has been interpreted to impose joint and several liability on defendants in part because of
“the difficulty a plaintiff encounters in trying to prove that the actions of a particular defendant were the
cause in fact of the hazardous substances, especially at sites where many companies and individuals
contributed substances”); see also Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 2007) (“CERCLA
manifests Congress’s intent that hazardous waste sites should be cleaned up and that those responsible
for the contamination should bear the costs.”); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d
1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he two essential purposes of CERCLA [are] . . . ‘that the federal
government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to the
problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal . . . [and] that those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility
for remedying the harmful conditions they created.’” (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986))).
274
A number of courts have rejected apportionment for commingled waste. See William C. Tucker,
All Is Number: Mathematics, Divisibility and Apportionment Under Burlington Northern, 22 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 322 n.47 (2011) (assembling cases where apportionment was rejected).
275
See id. at 316 (“[I]n proving that the harm at a Superfund site is divisible, a defendant must take
into account a number of factors relating not just to the contribution of a particular defendant to the
harm, but also to the effect of that defendant’s waste on the environment, including the ‘relative
toxicity, migratory potential, degree of migration or “synergistic capacities” of the hazardous
substances at issue.’” (quoting United States v. Agway, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 545, 548 (N.D.N.Y.
2002))).
276
For an example of a court rejecting apportionment because of unknown synergistic potential,
see United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1491, 1504 (E.D. Ark. 1997), which rejected
volumetric apportionment based on the number of barrels, because where “hazardous substances are
commingled, a defendant cannot rely on merely volumetric evidence.”
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types of inquiries have proven unworkable in other tort contexts and have
been squarely criticized as a result.277
The complication of apportionment, as it turns out, may be a reason to
adopt a more simplified view of background stressors, one where
background stressors are simply accepted as part of the inherent character
of the injured ecosystem. Of course, as in the CERCLA context, if a
defendant insists on apportionment to reduce its liability, the court could
shift the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that harm could
be apportioned.278 The issue of burden shifting even outside the context of
apportionment is taken up later.
IV. IN SEARCH OF CLARITY AND A NEW CAUSAL PARADIGM
By unpacking the core causation challenges, some of the existing tort
innovations can be ruled out as possible solutions. More importantly,
existing tools can be better assessed. In particular, this Part examines the
viability of three approaches that courts have used to resolve difficult-toprove cases of causation. First, it is possible that courts should simply
continue to apply a contributing factor test. This Part considers that
possibility and explains how courts might avoid unduly restricting the
usefulness of the contributing factor test for resolving long-term harms.
Next, this Part examines whether the general–specific causation framework
adopted in toxic tort would be beneficial for long-term ecological harms. In
doing so, this Part explores whether a risk-of-injury analysis, like that
adopted by some courts in the medical malpractice or smoker–asbestos
cases, might ultimately strike the right balance between holding responsible
actors accountable and protecting defendants from undue liability. Finally,
this Part discusses when courts might reasonably resort to a burden-shifting
framework.
A. Assessing the Contributing Factor Test
Can the contributing factor test properly assign liability and respond to
problems of background stressors and synergistic effects? The roots of the
substantial factor test suggest that its more lenient counterpart—the
contributing factor test—could be applied to find liability among multiple
277

See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of
Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 865 (1987) (rejecting proposals for proportionate causation,
remarking that “[l]ogical though this approach might be, it is unfortunately very impractical, because
nothing even remotely as precise a proxy for the probability of responsibility as market share is
available in most nonsignature disease cases”).
278
See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(“[W]here the conduct of two or more persons liable under § 9607 [of CERCLA] has combined to
violate the statute, and one or more of the defendants seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the
entire harm is capable of apportionment, the burden of proof as to apportionment is upon each
defendant.”).
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forces, whether natural or man-made. To be sure, the doctrine appears
suited to handle problems of synergistic harms, and nothing in the tort
doctrines themselves would prohibit extension of the contributing factor
test to the oil spill context where there is a single release. More
importantly, the intuitive nature of the test would provide much-needed
flexibility in an area where injuries and causal pathways will be diverse and
will require a nimble hand in determining when causation has been
established.
To be sure, doctrines of great flexibility can also bring great confusion.
In that sense, the courts would be wise to clarify the contours of the
contributing factor test before adopting it wholesale. Indeed, the few courts
that have adopted the contributing factor test in the classic CERCLA
context have perhaps left more questions than they have answered. Before
simply endorsing the contributing factor test, therefore, courts would be
wise to (1) clarify what the contributing factor test requires and (2) avoid
unnecessary restrictions that undermine the test’s usefulness for addressing
background stressors and synergistic harms.
1. Clarifying the Test.—Courts that have grappled with setting the
proper causal standard for natural resource damages claims have
considered whether to adopt the substantial factor test or its more relaxed
cousin, the contributing factor test. Some have adopted the substantial
factor test and some have rejected it. All have assumed that the test has a
single formulation, as if calling it by name carries with it a well-settled and
clear body of jurisprudence. In truth, the substantial factor test has taken on
several forms.279 The range of formulations helps to explain why courts in
the natural resource damages context have been thus far unable to speak
with much uniformity or clarity regarding the appropriate causal standard.
The early form of the substantial factor test would hold a defendant
liable, even where there are several tortious acts, if the defendant’s conduct
was “a material element and a substantial factor” in bringing about the
harm.280 The twin fires case opened the test up to cases where natural forces
combined with tortious conduct to cause harm.281 Notably, both of these
more classic versions require each cause to be capable of the entire harm
standing alone.282 As discussed above, that requirement could prove
279

Robertson, supra note 140, at 1776 (describing confusion associated with courts having used
the term “substantial factor” test in three different senses).
280
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 36, § 41, at 267.
281
Robertson, supra note 140, at 1779 n. 57.
282
See ITT Indus., Inc. v. Borgwarner, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 2d 848, 876 (W.D. Mich. 2010)
(“[W]here two or more causes have concurred to bring about an event, and any one of them, operating
alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, ‘the defendant’s conduct is a cause of the
event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.’” (quoting Artesian Water
Co. v. Gov’t of New Castle Cnty., 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 (D. Del. 1987))); In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 461, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the
need to show that “defendant’s contribution, taken alone, would have caused an injury” as the defining

523

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

problematic for long-term harms that result from synergistic impacts of the
oil spill in combination with background stressors.
That said, the California Supreme Court’s version of the substantial
factor test would assign liability to even “very minor force[s]” so long as
they contributed to the harm in some way.283 This version appears to
impose liability even for synergistic causes and might even equate to what
other courts are terming the contributing factor test.
Related to these relatively simple statements of the substantial factor
test, some courts have concluded that multiple forces contributing to the
harm will be deemed causes-in-fact so long as their conduct viewed as a
whole gave rise to the harm and so long as any one force is not so
insignificant when compared to the others.284 One such version of this is
really a but-for inquiry, where there are many individual but-for causes that
combine to create injury even though none of them standing alone would
have generated the harm. Indeed, in this version courts appear to say they
are applying the substantial factor test and then confusingly go on to
examine causation under the traditional but-for test.285 Other courts apply
the substantial factor test to resolve issues of proximate cause.286 In an
apparent attempt to assemble these various perturbations, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts introduces yet another set of several factors for courts to
consider.287

feature of the substantial factor test (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 644 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
283
Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 404 (Cal. 1999).
284
See Robertson, supra note 140, at 1776–77; see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 36,
§ 41, at 267–68 (describing a similar test).
285
See Robertson, supra note 140, at 1779 & n.60 (describing this phenomenon and citing cases
such as Hasha v. Calcasieu Parish Policy Jury, 651 So. 2d 865, 874–75 (La. Ct. App. 1995)).
286
See id. at 1780. In a 1912 article in the Harvard Law Review, Jeremiah Smith proposed using
the substantial factor test to guide the proximate cause inquiry. See Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in
Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 308–10 (1912). Some courts have taken up the suggestion. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 878 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (holding that jury instructions
should use the term “substantial factor” rather than “proximate cause” because the latter term was more
likely to mislead jurors and confuse). But see Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1050–51 (Cal. 2003)
(clarifying that Mitchell did not repudiate the “but for” test for causation).
287
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433, at 432 (1965). These factors, on the whole,
appear to be more in line with the version of the test that would hold contributing forces liable for the
harm:
1. The extent to which the defendant’s actions contributed to the harm, compared to the extent to
which other forces contributed to the harm;
2. Whether the defendant’s actions created a force or series of forces that operated up to the time
of the harm, or by contrast, whether the defendant’s actions were harmless until acted upon by
forces outside the defendant; and
3. The amount of time that elapsed between the defendant’s actions and the harm.
See id. Of note, this last consideration would systematically undermine the recovery of long-term
damages, as by definition that is a category of harms for which substantial time has elapsed between the
conduct and the injury. Courts should approach the application of the Restatement cautiously in the
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The lesson, at bottom, is that the substantial factor test is not a rigid or
mechanical one. It is intuitive in nature and has given rise to many
formulations. This means that courts purporting to apply the substantial
factor test to resolve causation issues need to be deliberate in their
description and application of the test. Simply uttering “substantial factor
test” does not in and of itself clarify the causal standard being applied.288
Rather, it invites confusion unless additional parameters are set forth.
Confusion is precisely what appears to be emerging in the natural
resource damages context. In particular, the district courts in Asarco and
Acushnet River rejected the substantial factor test in favor of the less
restrictive contributing factor test. But less restrictive as compared to what?
Neither court adequately defined the dimensions of the test that it was
rejecting, making it more difficult to understand the alternative that it had
in mind. Since there are many versions of the substantial factor test, more
information is needed to discern what causal test the courts meant to reject
or adopt. In addition, the Montrose court out of California adopted the
substantial factor test, which may effectively amount to the contributing
factor test anyway depending on the version that the court had in mind.289
The Asarco case offers the most thorough analysis. It relies on a Ninth
Circuit opinion involving a CERCLA cost recovery action.290 In that
opinion, Boeing v. Cascade Corp., the Ninth Circuit described the twin
fires version of the substantial factor test and concluded that such a test is
appropriate in the special case of causal overdetermination:
[W]here either polluter’s conduct would have caused the same response cost
to be incurred in the same amount, and the conduct was of substantially equal
blameworthiness, the proper construction of the causation requirement in the
statute is that both polluters should be treated as having caused the response
cost.291

Having referenced this traditional test for causation, the Asarco court
went on to note that “for the response cost claim, traditional notion[s] of
proximate cause do[] not apply.”292 Though the court recognized that—
unlike in response cost claims—there is a causation requirement for injury
to natural resources, the court concluded that the “causation standard for
[natural resource damages] actions is also less restrictive than traditional
context of long-term injuries for that reason, or risk systematically undermining Congress’s intent to
allow recovery for injuries that are long-term in nature.
288
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997) (“The term
‘substantial factor’ has not been judicially defined with specificity . . . .”).
289
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
290
Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., No. CV91-0342NEJL, CV96-0122NEJL, 2001 WL
34139603, at *4–5 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2001) (citing Boeing v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
291
Boeing, 207 F.3d at 1185.
292
Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 2001 WL 34139603 at *5.
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federal common law.”293 The court rejected the “sole or substantially
contributing cause” test as too restrictive in the natural resource damages
context.294
It would appear that the court was at a minimum rejecting the classic
form of the substantial factor test—the trustee need not show that the
contributing cause would be sufficient to cause the injury if standing alone.
However, the court’s reference to proximate cause suggests that the court
might also have meant to relax the proximate cause inquiry and expand the
scope of liability to natural resource injuries that are more indirect and
further removed from the release itself. Unfortunately, the court’s analysis
of the substantial factor test is not specific enough in terms of torts
nomenclature to know for sure what the court had in mind, other than that
the new test ought to be less restrictive.
Of course, in a perfect world the causal test that the courts intended to
adopt would be obvious because the preferred test would be adequately
described. That too turns out to be problematic. In other words, not only is
it unclear what the Acushnet River and Asarco courts meant to reject in
terms of a substantial factor test, but it is also unclear what kind of causal
showing they intended the contributing factor test to require. Each court
refers to the contributing factor test as though that test is well established in
torts literature. This in fact is not the case. While the Restatement and the
literature discuss the substantial factor test, the contributing factor test does
not appear in the torts nomenclature.295
The best explanation of what the contributing factor test means comes
from the Asarco court. After rejecting the substantial factor test, the court
explained that “[i]n cases where releases have been commingled, the Court
finds the [t]rustees have the burden of proving a release that results in
commingled hazardous substances is a ‘contributing factor.’”296 The court
defined a contributing factor as “more than a de minimis amount—to an
extent that at least some of the injury would have occurred if only the
Defendant’s amount of release had occurred.”297 Setting aside the
qualification for commingled waste, the Asarco court appears to be
describing the California version of the substantial factor test, where even
very minor forces can be causes-in-fact sufficient to create liability. The
only limit appears to be that the contributing force is something more than
de minimis. What that threshold is, however, the court did not say. In future
cases, courts (or the legislature if it cares to take up the issue) can provide
293

Id.
Id.
295
See PROSSER, supra note 150, § 41, at 236–44, and DOBBS ET AL., supra note 92, §§ 186–187,
189, at 623–36, for absence of any reference to a relaxed form of the substantial factor test or the
contributing factor test.
296
Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 2001 WL 34139603 at *5.
297
Id.
294
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clarity regarding the contours of the contributing factor test by being more
explicit about what they are rejecting and what they mean to adopt.
To assist courts in their clarification, there may be some reference
points that can help ground the contributing factor test in existing principles
and thereby explain its dimensions. First, as mentioned above, the
contributing factor test could be a shorthand way of referring to the least
rigorous form of the substantial factor test, what this Article refers to as the
California version. Second, and similarly, the test might refer to a comment
made in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that explains, “[I]f the
defendant’s conduct had any effect, the effect was substantial.”298 Third,
some prominent commentators have suggested that the conduct of multiple
actors can be aggregated and considered as a whole using the but-for
inquiry:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their
combined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and
application of the but-for rule to them individually would absolve all of them,
the conduct of each is a cause in fact of the event.299

Professor Richard Wright similarly suggested conceptualizing
causation in a way that aggregates conduct or events into a set.300 Rather
than impose an aggregate but-for test, Wright would find causation has
been established “if the entire set of events is sufficient to cause the harm
and the defendant’s act is a necessary element of the set.”301 Under this
formulation, oil spills that set off a chain of events and contribute to an
altered natural environment might be lumped into a set of events that
together caused the injury and therefore give rise to liability. Wright’s
aggregate formulation appears consistent with the relaxed contributing
factor test.
A similar theory—called the commingled product theory—has been
applied in product liability cases. In a multidistrict litigation products
liability case involving groundwater contamination by a gasoline additive,
the Southern District of New York allowed the plaintiff to pursue punitive
damages under a commingled product theory.302 The court explained the
298

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. b (1965). The key difference is that the
Restatement would also impose a proximate cause inquiry whereby the significance of the contribution
is used as a threshold for holding a defendant liable. Id. § 431 cmt. a. By contrast, the contributing
factor test would appear to jettison proximate cause inquiry and hold any contributing cause liable so
long as it meets the de minimis bar.
299
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 36, § 41, at 268.
300
DOBBS, supra note 92, § 189, at 635.
301
Id. (citing Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1788–94
(1985)).
302
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 643 F.
Supp. 2d 461, 464–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing apportionment and describing earlier ruling on
commingled product theory).
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commingled product theory by contrasting it with the substantial factor
test:
What sets the commingled theory apart from the traditional theory of
causation . . . is that the [plaintiff] need not show that each individual
defendant’s contribution, taken alone, would have caused an injury. . . . [T]he
[plaintiff] need only show that the . . . defendant’s MTBE contributed to the
commingled product that caused the injury.303

Aside from the products liability context and its application to resolve
an indeterminate defendant problem,304 this description comes closest to the
contributing factor test that the Asarco court described. Importantly, the
spirit of the commingled product theory appears consistent with the
contributing factor test; both are attempts to modify traditional causal
standards for more complex tort situations that otherwise impose difficult
causal burdens on the plaintiff. In this way, the theory supports the
application of the contributing factor test to the difficult-to-prove cases of
long-term harm.
In sum, a survey of the torts literature suggests that the contributing
factor test, despite the paucity of citations provided by adopting courts like
Asarco, does have roots in tort doctrine and is a legitimate starting point for
determining causation in natural resource damages cases. The challenge for
the courts is to more plainly describe the dimensions of the test they mean
to adopt or reject. Without that, confusion and inconsistency among courts
will most certainly arise. Notably, this call for clarity applies regardless of
whether courts are choosing to adopt the substantial factor or the
contributing factor test. Depending on the contours of the test, in fact, they
could well be one and the same.
2. Avoiding Undue Limitations.—While the contributing factor test
has some appeal for resolving the causation challenges described in this
Article, no court has considered its application in the oil spill context. The
two courts that have adopted it were addressing fairly classic CERCLA
cases involving multiple polluters and a mixture of toxins in the release. In
doing so, these courts have not only failed to clarify the test, but they have
also introduced conditions that would make the test problematic in the oil
spill context or for long-term ecological harms more generally. In the

303

In re MTBE, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (some alterations in original) (quoting In re MTBE, 644 F.
Supp. 2d at 319) (internal quotation marks omitted).
304
Whereas CERCLA traditionally imposes joint and several liability, the commingled product
theory imposes only several liability determined by “the defendant’s share of the market at the time of
the injury.” In re MTBE, 644 F. Supp. 2d. at 320 (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 259, 274 n.72 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). In addition, the commingled
product theory presumes multiple defendants who have produced the same product. See In re MTBE,
591 F. Supp. 2d at 274–75. In the natural resource damage context, as noted above, there may or may
not be multiple defendants and there may be multiple kinds of toxins at issue.
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future, courts would be wise to avoid these limitations, unless deliberate
restrictions on liability were intended.
The first undue restriction was introduced by the Asarco court when it
adopted the contributing factor test only for commingled releases.305 On its
face, then, the court would appear to reject the application of the
contributing factor test to a single substance release like an oil spill. The
court, of course, did not consider harms from oil spills, much less longterm harms. If it had, the court might not have drawn a difference between
commingled and noncommingled waste.306 The injury lag times associated
with long-term harm increase the likelihood that the harm is due, at least in
part, to the synergistic impacts of multiple compounding ecosystem
stressors. In that sense, long-term harms are just as much a product of
“commingled” stressors as the harm resulting from the classic commingled
waste.
The second undue restriction introduced by the Asarco court is the
suggestion that plaintiffs prove that “at least some of the injury would have
occurred if only the Defendant’s amount of release had occurred.”307 To the
extent the court would require trustees to show that the amount of oil
released would be capable of causing the alleged injury on its own, this
aspect of the test could be problematic in its failure to account for
synergistic impacts.
In most situations, requiring the defendant’s release to be capable of
injury on its own poses little problem and even has some intuitive appeal.
For long-term injuries, however, considering the release in a vacuum may
not fully appreciate the synergistic nature of the release in combination
with other stressors. By even asking if a defendant’s release would have
created harm on its own, the test seems to invite the possibility that
stressors causing harm can be separated out from one another.
In that sense, the test as described by the Asarco court might
incorrectly encourage courts to consider the release in isolation and not the
greater context of the release. To be sure, any given toxic stressor might not
cause ecologically significant injury if the ecosystem were otherwise robust
and able to absorb some shock.308 That same amount of toxic input to an
already stressed ecosystem might, however, be enough to cause significant
population declines.309 In other words, background stressor and synergistic
impacts matter. For this reason, the test as articulated by the Asarco court
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Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., No. CV91-0342NEJL, CV96-0122NEJL, 2001 WL
34139603, at *5 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2001).
306
See supra text accompanying note 217.
307
2001 WL 34139603, at *5.
308
See Craig, A Match Made in Hell, supra note 12, at 1886–87 (describing resilience theory and
“an ecosystem’s ability to absorb change and persist in function and relationships”).
309
Id.
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does not appear to be responsive to the core causal challenges of long-term
harms.
In addition, recall that the purpose of CERCLA’s aggressive joint and
several liability scheme was avoiding the divisibility problems when there
are multiple tortfeasors whose hazardous substances have commingled in
some unknown way and have been released into the environment. To
require trustees seeking natural resource damages to prove that the longterm harm would have been caused by the oil acting in isolation simply
reverses the logic of the modified liability scheme.
What this means is that courts adopting the contributing factor test
should avoid articulating the test as requiring proof of harm by the
defendant’s release alone. The relevant inquiry may simply be whether the
evidence shows that the release, alone or in combination with other
stressors, contributed to the harm. That is the essence of the contributing
factor test and the problematic language might simply be an unnecessary
remnant of more traditional formulations of the substantial factor test.
B. Borrowing from Toxic Torts
Even if courts were to adopt the contributing factor test without some
of the undue and problematic limitations discussed here, courts will still
need to put a finer point on exactly what a trustee plaintiff will be required
to prove. To assist in that endeavor, courts may be wise to borrow from the
area of toxic torts.
Many of the distinguishing characteristics of long-term natural
resource damages claims are also true of toxic tort cases.310 In particular,
natural resource damages claims raise issues of sublethal injuries, long
latency periods, multiple causal agents, and aggregate risk. Likewise, toxic
tort plaintiffs tend to suffer from disease, fertility problems, or some other
chronic injury.311 In addition, toxic tort injuries often involve long latency
periods.312 In some cases, the time from exposure to the manifestation of
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Compare TOXIC TORTS, supra note 234, at 230 (describing the distinguishing characteristics of
harm caused by asbestos), with Rabin, supra note 151, at 27–32 (discussing the distinguishing
characteristics of toxic tort and environmental harm cases).
311
Rabin, supra note 151, at 27–32; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic
Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers’ Compensation Systems,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 864 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of proving causation for infertility
issues allegedly resulting from toxic exposure in the workplace).
312
TOXIC TORTS, supra note 234, at 228–30. While in many nontoxic tort cases the effect almost
immediately follows the cause, long latency periods are the primary reason that proving causation is so
difficult in toxic tort cases. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c, at 402 (2010) (“[T]he causes of some diseases, especially those with
significant latency periods, are generally much less well understood. Even known causes for certain
diseases may explain only a fraction of the incidence of such diseases, with the remainder due to
unknown causes.”).
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the disease can range from twenty to fifty years.313 And, like the problems
of synergistic causes giving rise to long-term ecological harms, toxic tort
cases may also involve multiple agents, capable of causing harm when
acting alone or in concert with other stressors.314 Finally, and relatedly,
some toxic tort cases raise the problem of aggregate risk, where a disease
might be the result of multiple exposures to the same or different toxic
products over time.315
Not surprisingly, toxic tort cases are notorious for raising causation
challenges. Indeed, the difficulty of proving causation is often the defining
characteristic setting toxic torts apart from regular torts.316 Notably, within
the toxic torts literature and jurisprudence, courts and scholars recognize
that deviation from traditional causal paradigms is both necessary and
appropriate.317 It is necessary to prevent injustice to injured plaintiffs who
would otherwise be left without a remedy. It is appropriate given the
flexibility of tort law to serve the demands of justice.
In light of the similarities between long-term ecological injuries and
toxic torts, the remainder of this Article will consider whether alternative
tort principles used in toxic tort law are appropriate paradigms for proving
causation in the natural resource damages context. In particular, this Part
considers how the differentiation of general and specific causation within
the toxic torts framework might clarify the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden
for natural resource damages claims. In doing so, this Part examines the
risk-of-injury approach to satisfying the substantial factor test and
considers the applicability of burden-shifting paradigms that seek to ease
the plaintiff’s causal burden. Ultimately, this Part concludes that some
combination of these tools might be a good fit for proving long-term
ecological injuries.
1. Proving General and Specific Causation.—In toxic tort cases, the
causation-in-fact inquiry is typically framed as two issues: general
causation and specific causation.318 General causation addresses whether
313

TOXIC TORTS, supra note 234, at 230.
Id. at 159.
315
See Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the Problem of
Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 234 (1992) (discussing synergistic effects of toxic exposure and
raising the example of smoking and asbestos); see also F.D.K. Liddell, The Interaction of Asbestos and
Smoking in Lung Cancer, 45 ANNALS OCCUPATIONAL HYGIENE 341, 342 (2001) (examining the history
and evidence to present “the most reliable assessment of the interaction between asbestos exposure and
cigarette smoking in the causation of lung cancer”).
316
TOXIC TORTS, supra note 234, at 159 (“With the rise of toxic torts . . . proof of causation has
become one of the most complex and controversial aspects of tort liability.”).
317
For a sampling of the literature providing suggestions for relaxing the causal paradigm in the
area of toxic torts, see Berger, supra note 223; Gold, supra note 171; and Allen Rostron, Beyond
Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV.
151 (2004).
318
TOXIC TORTS, supra note 234, at 192.
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the substance at issue is capable of causing the type of harm alleged in the
case.319 Does smoking cause lung cancer? Scientific evidence tending to
prove general causation might include some combination of
epidemiological studies, clinical trials, animal studies, time trend data,
biological mechanism research, or in vitro studies.320
Assuming a plaintiff can successfully establish that the offending
agent is a possible cause of injury, the plaintiff must then prove specific
causation. Specific causation asks the more pointed question: whether
exposure to the substance at issue caused the plaintiff’s injury.321 Specific
causation requires linking a particular injury to the defendant’s release. Did
the plaintiff develop lung cancer from smoking? Because multiple agents
might be theoretically capable of causing an alleged injury, the process of
proving specific causation often involves a differential diagnosis whereby
the plaintiff “rules out” alternative causes.322 The heart of proving specific
causation is showing the plaintiff’s exposure to the toxic agent.323 The
plaintiff must also show that the dose (the amount of exposure) was
capable of causing the alleged harm.324
In the oil spill context, proving general causation would require
showing that exposure to oil is capable of causing the alleged injury—e.g.,
disrupting the reproductive capacity of sea otters. Proving specific
causation would require showing that sea otters were exposed to oil in
doses capable of causing injury and that the oil came from the defendant’s
release.
By itself, the general and specific causation framework does not ease
the causal burden so much as clarify it. Indeed, the epidemiologic evidence
required to satisfactorily prove specific causation is simply a form of the
319

See id. at 193.
See id. at 188 (citing JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDICTIN ON TRIAL 45–61 (1998) (describing the
types of evidence used to prove causation in toxic tort cases involving Bendictin, a morning sickness
pill given to pregnant women and later alleged to cause birth defects)); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing the persuasiveness of epidemiological
studies in showing general causation for Bendictin litigation).
321
TOXIC TORTS, supra note 234, at 193.
322
See id. at 192–93; see also Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The process of differential diagnosis is
undoubtedly important to the question of ‘specific causation.’ If other possible causes of an injury
cannot be ruled out, or at least the probability of their contribution to causation minimized, then the
‘more likely than not’ threshold for proving causation may not be met.”).
323
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt c., at 405 (2010) (noting that in some cases the general and specific causation inquiries might be
merged, but “[i]n any case, plaintiff’s exposure to the toxic agent must be established”).
324
See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein, Toxic Torts: The Devil Is in the Dose, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 551
(2008); see also Mancuso v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 391, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“A fundamental tenet of toxicology is that the ‘dose makes the poison’ and that all chemical agents,
including water, are harmful if consumed in large quantities, while even the most toxic substances are
harmless in minute quantities.”).
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classic preponderance of the evidence standard.325 It is not clear, therefore,
that the framework alters the underlying and traditional causation
paradigm.326 Rather, it simply provides a formula for applying that
traditional paradigm to a toxic tort context.327
If this general and specific causation framework were applied to the
natural resource damages context, the largest hurdle to proving causation
would be providing evidence of specific causation. It is conceivable, in
other words, that government trustees could obtain evidence that exposure
to oil, or even weathered oil with an altered toxic profile, was capable of
causing harm. Proving specific causation, however, would ostensibly
require some understanding of exposure pathways, biological mechanisms
connecting exposure to injury, and cause–effect relationships between
various resource elements within the affected ecosystem.
In this sense, the complication of proving specific causation is
amplified in the natural resource damages context. There are two reasons
for this. First, our research and understanding of how the human body
works is more advanced than our understanding of the feedback
mechanisms and cause–effect relationship within the marine ecosystem in
which oil spills take place. Second, the exposure pathways and biological
mechanisms underlying species disease and demographic collapse are
magnitudes more complex in the natural resource damages context than in
harm to a single human plaintiff.
The Pacific herring fishery collapse in Prince William Sound just three
years after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill is a good example. That collapse was
a catastrophic injury for which there is still little definitive evidence linking
it to the Exxon spill. There is strong circumstantial evidence and there is
some evidence demonstrating an exposure pathway, but the time lag and
the complex biological mechanisms involved make it a difficult puzzle to
solve with certainty.
Proving injury to natural resources involves not just proof that a
particular toxin caused a particular disease in a single individual. Rather, in
the context of oil spills, showing harm to natural resources involves
understanding causal relationships between an oil spill and long-term
species demographics when the exposure pathways are both direct and
indirect and when the interdependencies of species might disperse the
325

See Poulter, supra note 315, at 229 & n.189; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass
Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
326
See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980) (citations omitted) (“We begin
with the proposition that, as a general rule, the imposition of liability depends upon a showing by the
plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality under
the defendant’s control. The rule applies whether the injury resulted from an accidental event or from
the use of a defective product.”).
327
See Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort Cases, 108 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 479, 486 (2003) (describing general and specific causation as a process of plying apart the
traditional causal inquiry into two levels).
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direct impacts of a spill well into the food web.328 That means there is not
likely to be definitive evidence that oil exposure to herring roe in year one
is capable of causing the Pacific herring fishery to collapse in year three,329
or that the exposure to chemical dispersants used in the wake of the BP
Gulf Oil Spill could cause some yet-unknown long-term injury.330
A causation paradigm that requires definitive proof of specific
causation is not likely to serve the broader goals of tort law any more than
traditional paradigms. In that sense, we might be cautious about applying
wholesale the general framework for proving toxic tort claims to oil
spills—namely, the requirement that plaintiffs show some combination of
evidence proving general and specific causation. And yet, the general and
specific causation framework is quite useful in focusing the discussion of
what evidentiary proof a government trustee would have to offer in order to
recover damages for long-term ecological injuries.
2. Applying a Risk-of-Injury Approach.—If we return to the
ruminations of Judge Calabresi and accept the premise that market
deterrence goals are served by assigning liability to the cheapest cost
avoider, some causal link between the accident and the injury is
necessary.331 That causal link, however, does not have to take the form of a
traditional but-for relationship.332 Rather, Calabresi explains that the more
relevant inquiry is whether the defendant’s actions increased the chances
that the injury would occur: “There is a causal link between an act or
activity and an injury when we conclude on the basis of the available
evidence that the recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances
that the injury will also occur.”333 In other words, a risk-of-injury analysis is
the key.334
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See supra Part I.B. for discussion of complicated and interdependent relationships that drive
ecosystem function.
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See discussion supra Part I.B and notes 114–16.
330
See Seth Borenstein, Gulf Oil Spill Dispersants ‘Sticking Around,’ Long-Term Effects Remain
Unclear, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2011, 5:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/27/
gulf-oil-spill-chemical-d_n_814749.html; see also Alice C. Ortmann et al., Dispersed Oil Disrupts
Microbial Pathways in Pelagic Food Webs, PLOS ONE, July 2012, available at http://www.plosone.
org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0042548&representation
=PDF.
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See Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 35, at 84 (to identify the cheapest cost avoider,
“[g]enerally a causal link between an activity and an injury would be required”).
332
Id. at 85 (noting that the “role of but for causation in a system of market deterrence is less
obvious than that of causal linkage” and even suggesting that “[o]ne could do away with the but for test
and employ other methods to achieve the same end”).
333
Id. at 71. See also id. at 84–85 (discussing causal link as the relevant inquiry for serving market
deterrence goals).
334
Several scholars have examined the viability of a risk-of-injury test in the toxic torts context.
See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk–Injury Divide, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1671 (2007) (arguing that with advances in the emerging field of genomics, toxic tort law can
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Calabresi’s framing of the critical issue as one of risk of injury is
consistent with how some courts have approached the definition of
substantial factor in some of the leading smoker–asbestos cases. In those
cases, the plaintiff is typically a long-time smoker who brings an action
against his employer for asbestos-related injuries or wrongful death.335 Like
claims related to long-term ecological injuries, the smoker–asbestos cases
raise issues involving synergistic causes, scientific uncertainty, and long
latency periods.336
In one such case, Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the Supreme
Court of California considered what type of evidentiary showing the
plaintiff had to make under the substantial factor test in order to recover for
asbestos-related injuries. The court began by noting that the plaintiff had
the burden of establishing causation and that in the California courts this
meant showing that the defective products supplied by the defendant were a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury.337 The court continued with a
detailed examination of the evidentiary proof that a plaintiff would have to
submit in order to meet its burden. In particular, the plaintiff would need to
show exposure to the defendant’s product.338 The plaintiff did not have to
show, however, that fibers from the defendant’s product were the actual
cause of the lung cancer.339 To that, the court remarked that “[p]laintiffs
cannot be expected to prove the scientifically unknown details of
carcinogenesis, or trace the unknowable path of a given asbestos fiber.”340
Rather, to prove causation, the plaintiff only needed to show that exposure
to a particular product was a substantial factor contributing to the plaintiff’s
risk of developing cancer.341 The court concluded by reminding the parties
that “[t]he substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring
only that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or
theoretical.”342 Given the similarity between the California substantial
factor test and the contributing factor test, the Rutherford court’s treatment
of the causation standard in the smoking–asbestos context is particularly
relevant to the problem of proving long-term ecological harms.
The risk-of-injury analysis has also been adopted by several courts in
the medical malpractice area.343 The leading case from the Washington
move away from traditional showings of physical injury to support recovery); id. at 1679 n.17
(assembling the toxic tort literature on risk-of-injury theory).
335
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
336
See, e.g., id. at 1206, 1209, 1218.
337
Id. at 1214.
338
Id. at 1223.
339
Id. at 1219–20.
340
Id. at 1219.
341
Id. at 1220.
342
Id.
343
See, e.g., Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E. 2d 357, 368 (Ill. 2002) (recognizing and joining
trend toward “allowing compensation for increased risk of future injury as long as it can be shown to a
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Supreme Court, Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound,
considered whether a physician could be held liable for professional
negligence when he failed to timely diagnose lung cancer and thereby
statistically decreased the plaintiff’s chance of survival.344 The court
adopted a risk-of-injury analysis. Otherwise, the court noted, a defendant
might be “completely insulated because of uncertainties as to the
consequences of his negligent conduct.”345
If courts were to adopt a risk-of-injury analysis for long-term
ecological injuries, government trustees seeking natural resource damages
would be required to show that the injured resource was exposed to the
defendant’s oil and that oil exposure increased the risk of the injury
alleged. This later showing would likely require some evidence of general
causation, namely that the oil is capable of causing the harm alleged.
To tie the risk-of-injury analysis back to the general and specific
causation framework, we might consider whether courts that adopt a riskof-injury threshold are effectively requiring plaintiffs to satisfy the two-part
inquiry. It would appear so. As for general causation, plaintiffs must show
that the defendant’s product is capable of causing the type of harm alleged.
Without that showing, plaintiffs could not meet the risk-of-injury test. In
other words, if the defendant’s product is not capable as a general matter of
causing the type of harm alleged it cannot be said to increase the risk of
that harm. Similarly, the risk-of-injury threshold requires plaintiffs to
satisfy the specific causation inquiry, albeit by less traditional means. To
that end, plaintiffs prove a causal link between the injury and the
defendant’s product by showing exposure to defendant’s product.
Importantly, the risk-of-injury analysis does not require plaintiffs to show
specific causation by demonstrating exactly how exposure to defendant’s
product caused the particular harm. Plaintiffs simply have to show that the
defendant’s product increased the risk of injury. That alternative
formulation of specific causation is necessary, as the courts note, because
the scientific complexity and uncertainty of demonstrating precise causal
pathways would otherwise insulate defendants from liability for harms
caused after long latency periods and synergistic causes. In the risk-ofinjury cases, in other words, courts are necessarily taking a broader view of
specific causation. At the same time, the courts are ensuring that plaintiffs
are proving a causal link by satisfying both parts of the general and specific
causation framework.

reasonable degree of certainty that the defendant’s wrongdoing created the increased risk”); Herskovits
v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (adopting a risk-of-injury
analysis); see also VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES AND
MATERIALS 281–84 (12th ed. 2010) (assembling the risk-of-injury cases in the medical malpractice
context).
344
664 P.2d at 474.
345
Id. at 477 (quoting Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa. 1978)).
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Notably, the risk-of-injury analysis allows a court to tailor the
requirements of specific causation to long-term natural resource damages.
In that sense, the general and specific causation framework could be a
workable approach for long-term ecological injuries if approached in
combination with a risk-of-injury threshold. There is, of course, nothing
magical about the general and specific causation framework, and it is not
an indispensable part of the causation inquiry. In fact, courts that apply the
risk-of-injury threshold are not necessarily discussing it in the context of
the general and specific causation framework. In Rutherford, for example,
the California Supreme Court adopted a risk-of-injury analysis as part of
the substantial factor test.346 It is useful, however, to test how these various
approaches fit together and note that they are consistent. In that way, courts
that are otherwise inclined to apply the general and specific causation
framework to toxic tort-like cases can continue to do so and still approach
the specific causation inquiry through a risk-of-injury threshold.
3. Shifting the Burden of Proof.—As noted, problems would arise if
courts were to adopt wholesale the general and specific causation
framework without matching the needs of the specific causation inquiry to
the challenges of the long-term tort. In that way, the general–specific
causation framework does not by itself resolve the causal difficulties faced
by trustees because the issue of proving specific causation looms large.
While one way to alleviate this difficulty is to adopt a risk-of-injury
approach, another way is through burden shifting. In particular, if courts
were willing to shift the burden of proof in cases where trustees are
claiming long-term natural resource injuries, a general and specific
causation paradigm might prove viable in its current form. In fact, one
could imagine a framework by which trustees were required to rule in oil as
a possible causal agent under a general causation inquiry and then
defendants were given the opportunity to demonstrate that another specific
cause was more likely the actual cause.
Notably, the Rutherford case is actually a burden-shifting case at its
core. In that smoker–asbestos case, the California Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether the trial court erred in giving a burden-shifting
instruction on the issue of causation.347 Recall that plaintiffs ordinarily carry
the burden of proof on causation. In that case, the trial court shifted the
burden to the defendant on the theory that the case presented potentially
346

See Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997); see also Shelly Brinker,
Comment, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation Barriers
Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289 (1999) (arguing that courts should
return to a substantial factor approach to establishing causation in the toxic tort context); id. at 1321
(discussing Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d
1417 (10th Cir. 1987), where the court applied the substantial factor approach to resolve plaintiffs’
allegations of injury from exposure to radiation).
347
Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1206.
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insurmountable barriers to proving causation in light of the long latency
periods and exposure to multiple forms and brands of asbestos products
with varying degrees of toxicity.348 Ultimately, the California Supreme
Court concluded that a burden-shifting instruction was unnecessary given
that the plaintiff could satisfy the substantial factor test by simply showing
that the defendant’s product contributed in some way to the increased risk
of injury.349 The causation test was lenient and did not require the plaintiff
to prove “with medical exactitude that fibers from a particular defendant’s
asbestos-containing products were those, or among those, that actually
began the cellular process of malignancy.”350 In other words, the application
of the risk-of-injury threshold to satisfy an otherwise lenient substantial
factor test was enough to afford the plaintiff a reasonable chance of
recovery even when synergistic causes and long latency periods were
involved.351
If the substantial factor test (or contributing factor test, as the case may
be) proves a burdensome standard, and otherwise threatens to leave trustees
“remediless”352 for long-term ecological injuries, a burden-shifting
framework might be justified. In other difficult-to-prove cases, courts and
Congress have seen fit to shift the burden of proving causation to the
defendant.353 Similarly, in some countries like China the courts
348

Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1219–20; see also Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App.
1995) (finding that burden shifting is inappropriate and unnecessary in asbestos cases).
350
Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1206.
351
But see Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1468–69 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Nebraska
law and holding that in concurrent cause cases “where the plaintiff can show that a defendant’s asbestos
dust caused some harm and possibly substantial harm but cannot show the relative contribution of that
defendant to the overall harm” the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that exposure to the
defendant’s product was not sufficient to be a substantial factor in causing the harm).
352
In the classic burden-shifting case of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (en banc), the
fundamental justification for shifting the burden was that all defendants might escape liability and the
plaintiff left “remediless.” Id. at 4.
353
Congress has provided burden-shifting frameworks in a number of different situations,
including workers’ compensation cases—see, e.g., Rainey v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp., 517 F.3d
632, 634–35 (2d Cir. 2008) (clarifying that, pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., once claimants have made out a prima facie case by
establishing that the claimant “suffered harm, and that workplace conditions . . . could have caused,
aggravated, or accelerated the harm,” even when there are preexisting conditions or prior conditions, the
burden of production shifts to employers to rebut a presumption of causation (quoting Am. Stevedoring
Ltd. v. Marinelli, 248 F.3d 54, 64–65 (2nd Cir. 2001)))—and discrimination cases—see, e.g., Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (clarifying that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
codified the burden-shifting and lower causation framework for Title VII discrimination claims based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (explaining that in Title VII cases, once a claimant has made out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the burden shifts “to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection”). In addition, courts have creatively allowed burden shifting to
promote fairness where innocent plaintiffs would otherwise be unable to prove causation because of
uncertainties as to particular causal pathways. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal.
349
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categorically shift the burden of disproving causation to the polluter in
environmental cases.354
4. Tying the Pieces of the Old Together to Form the New.—In the
end, some combination of a lenient substantial factor test, a risk-of-injury
analysis that is tied more to general causation than specific causation, and
burden-shifting frameworks when appropriate would assist courts in
resolving the causal challenges of long-term ecological injuries.
Specifically, if we follow the logic of Judge Calabresi and accept that
establishing a causal link is key to serving market deterrence, and if we
follow the analysis of the smoker–asbestos cases like Rutherford v. OwensIllinois Inc., we might arrive at a causation inquiry for long-term ecological
injuries that looks something like this:
First, the touchstone for proving causation is a relaxed form of the
substantial factor test, which some courts in the natural resource damages
area have labeled as the contributing factor test. Because this test is flexible
at its core, the test requires only that the oil spill was one factor (not
necessarily the factor) that contributed to the alleged long-term injury.
Second, to prove that the oil spill was a contributing factor, the
government trustees must prove that the injured resource was exposed to
the oil and that oil exposure would increase the risk of the injury alleged.
The trustees need not show the particular biological pathway or mechanism
by which the oil actually caused the alleged harm. This test assigns liability
even if there are other contributing causes or background stressors that
have combined to create the alleged harm.
Finally, if in a given case this framework would systematically
preclude recovery for long-term harms, the court may see fit to invoke a
burden-shifting framework. Such a move, however, would more likely be
reserved for a decision made by the legislature or after empirical evidence
regarding systematic undercompensation of long-term harms is available.

1980) (holding that once a plaintiff joins the manufacturers of a substantial share of DES that the
plaintiff’s mother may have taken, the burden shifts to the manufacturers to prove that they could not
have produced the injury-causing product); Summers, 199 P.2d at 3–4 (holding that the lower court
properly shifted the burden to the defendants to absolve themselves where both defendants negligently
shot at the plaintiff and one pellet entered the plaintiff’s eye). Scholars have also proposed burden
shifting when there are extraordinary challenges preventing plaintiffs from proving causation. See
Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 89, 92, 136 (2005) (suggesting that in cases where the plaintiff can prove the pesticide
manufacturer “failed to conduct reasonably available testing to gather currently unavailable scientific
evidence on the issue of causation” the burden should shift to the defendant to rebut the presumption
that “the defendant’s failure to conduct the testing was negligent, and that the testing would have
resulted in data not already available that would cause a reasonable manufacturer to take the pesticide
off the market or use a less harmful design”).
354
See Adam Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China, 41 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,895, 10,897 (2011) (discussing Articles 65 and 66 of the new China Tort Law,
which “unambiguously state that the burden of proof in environmental tort actions is on the polluter”).
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CONCLUSION
As scientific studies in the wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
demonstrate, long-term ecological injuries are increasingly foreseeable. For
oil spills and toxic substance releases, Congress expressly provided a
mechanism for recovering for long-term injuries: natural resource damages.
There are several factors, however, that undermine trustees’ ability to
recover long-term injuries. Some are complications of Mother Nature
herself. Some are complications of our legal system.
This Article is the first to combine the scientific and legal literature to
provide an in-depth study of the causation challenges of proving long-term
ecological harms. Using the long-term studies done in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, this Article establishes the causation difficulties of
proving long-term injuries and demonstrates why a new causal paradigm is
necessary. In particular, this Article shows why, in the face of a new
scientific paradigm, traditional causation standards—e.g., the but-for test or
the classic form of the substantial factor test—will exclude otherwise
legitimate claims for long-term injuries.
This Article provides the academic foundation for a suitable causation
paradigm. First, it demonstrates that an alternative paradigm is permissible
under the statutory framework, is needed within the jurisprudence, and is
desired to meet the central tenets of tort law. Second, it surveys tort
principles and the toxic torts literature to offer a solution. Strangely, the
seemingly obvious overlap between two worlds—one contemplating latent
injuries to human bodies and one examining long-term injuries to
ecosystems—has not been the focus of scholarly attention before. While
some scholars have examined similar causation problems in toxic tort and
mass product liability cases, none have examined the challenges implicated
in the context of natural resource damages.
Ultimately, while this Article set out in search of a new paradigm for a
new problem, in the end the flexibility of tort law and the problems of
latent injuries in other cases leave us with an emerging problem that, when
approached with care and consideration, can be resolved through a careful
combination of existing tools that are meant to alleviate some of the
inherent difficulties of proving causation when synergistic causes and long
latency periods are involved. To that end, this Article argues that the
intuitive nature of the contributing factor test makes it appealing in light of
the many varying fact scenarios that are typical in natural resource damages
cases.
But, if a contributing factor test is more widely applied in the natural
resource damages context, courts should clarify the parameters of the test.
A meaningful and appropriate test would recognize that natural forces
combine with man-made forces to create injuries. Background stressors and
synergistic causes are at the heart of the causal challenges posed by longterm ecological injuries. In addition, the contributing factor test should be
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applied in combination with a risk-of-injury analysis. Absent a lenient
application of the substantial factor test, preferably with a risk-of-injury
threshold, a burden-shifting approach might be appropriate. Whatever the
precise formulation, it is important to see that tort law is capable of
adapting to emerging issues posed by long-term ecological injuries without
resorting to legislative reform.
That said, legislatures might still consider whether the time and
expense of figuring out how to assign liability for long-term harms could or
should be avoided entirely. In particular, though this Article meets the
challenge of proving causation on its own terms and explains how tort law
is suited to meet those challenges, legislative reform could simply jettison
the causal inquiry. Or, legislatures might simply invoke a multiplier to
calculate liability for long-term harms as some fraction of the stillcomplicated but more measurable short-term impacts. Indeed, trustees
might look to the amount and type of oil spill as well as other defining
factors related to the sensitivity of the marine ecosystem impacted to create
a liability matrix.
The point here is that the causal inquiry is only central to the question
of redress so long as proof of causation is part of the statutory framework.
This Article seeks a tort-based solution for overcoming causal barriers to
the recovery of long-term ecological injuries. Other work might fairly
consider innovations in the statutory or regulatory framework to address
causation or other barriers.

541

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

542

